Self referential and social cognition in adolscents with autistic spectrum disorder by Woods, Damian Joseph Lloyd
1 
 
SELF REFERENTIAL AND SOCIAL COGNITION IN ADOLESCENTS WITH 
AUTISTIC SPECTRUM DISORDERS 
 
Damian Joseph Lloyd Woods 
 
 
Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Clinical Psychology (D. Clin. Psychol.) 
The University of Leeds 
Academic Unit of Psychiatry and Behavioural Sciences  
School of Medicine 
 
 
August 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his/her own and that appropriate credit has 
been given where reference has been made to the work of others 
 
This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no 
quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
2 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to sincerely thank Dr Chris Moulin for his excellent, tireless support and 
supervision. In particular, I would like to thank him and Sylvie Collins for their understanding 
and advice during a difficult period part way through my Dclin Psych Doctorate. Chris’s speedy 
feedback during write up has also been greatly valued.  
 
I would like to thank all the participants who kindly took part in the study; without them 
research would grind to a halt. 
 
I would also like to thank my family, in particular Michael, Glenys and John, for their constant, 
unconditional support, and for helping with proof reading. I’m also very grateful to my 
wonderful niece Bethany for helping me trial my testing.  
 
Finally, due appreciation is given to my friends, both on and outside the doctorate course, but 
particularly those who shared the Dclin journey. Long may putting the world to rights over a 
pint at the Fav continue. 
 
 
Damian Woods,  
 
Leeds, 29/07/12 
3 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
A dominant social cognition model has construed the central socio-communicative 
impairments in Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASDs) as deficits in understanding others’ minds- 
what other people know, intend, believe and feel. Difficulties for individuals with ASD have 
been well documented on “Theory of Mind” (TOM) tasks designed to tap these skills (Boucher, 
2012). Recently however, research has shifted toward exploring how individuals with ASD 
understand their own minds, and to look at the cognitive mechanisms involved in thinking 
about “the self”.  The present thesis is situated in the context of this emerging self-referential 
cognition (SRC) research, including its close connection to social cognition.  
 
This thesis explored the quantitative and qualitative differences in neurotypical (NT) 
adolescents and those with ASD in generating self-images (e.g. concepts such as I am a female, 
I am a footballer, I am kind) through use of novel fluency tasks (the ‘I Am’ and ‘(s)he is’ tasks) 
based on the Twenty Statements Test (TST; Kuhn and McPartland, 1954). Relationships 
between these tasks and social cognition (TOM measures) were also explored. The results 
indicated that both NT adolescents and those with ASD exhibited a self-reference effect (SRE), 
generating more statements about themselves than other people. The magnitude of the SREs 
was found to be significantly related to several TOM measures such as performance on the 
Mind in the Eyes task of emotion recognition. Moreover, the ASD group produced significantly 
less personal attributions across all fluency tasks, but a similar number of social and physical 
attributions, compared to the NT group. This mirrored emerging findings that indicate a 
specific deficit in psychological but not physical self awareness in ASD (e.g. Williams, 2010).  
Additionally, the ASD group were found to make significantly fewer spontaneous social 
stereotypes on the (s)he is tasks, such as the “Beauty is Good” stereotype, a finding which 
contrasts with previous research showing preserved social stereotyping in children with ASD 
(Fonesca et al, 2011). The theoretical and clinical implications of these findings for individuals 
with ASD are discussed with reference to the “absent-self hypothesis” (e.g. Frith, 2003). 
Additionally, the promising utility of fluency measures in capturing important aspects of SRC 
are also noted, including suggestions for further research. 
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1.0 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
“He that knows himself knows others” 
-Charles Caleb Colton (1780–1832) 
1.1. OVERVIEW 
 
Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASDs) are characterized by wide ranging and varied impairments 
in three broad areas: social communication, social interaction, and in narrow, repetitive 
behaviours (Wing, 1996). One of the dominant social cognition models has conceptualised the 
central socio-communicative impairments seen in ASD as deficits in the cognitive mechanisms 
employed in understanding others’ minds (Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith, 1985; Baron-Cohen 
2008). This model encompasses the abilities used to understand what others know, believe, 
intend and feel in various social situations. Deficits in ASD have been extensively documented 
utilising various “theory of mind” tasks designed to tap these abilities (Boucher, 2012). 
Recently however, research has shifted towards exploring the cognitive differences and 
deficits in how individuals with ASDs understand their own minds (e.g. Williams, 2010; Lind 
2010; Lombardo, Barnes, Wheelwright & Baron-Cohen, 2010). That is, research has begun to 
look at the cognitive mechanisms involved in thinking about “the self”. A picture of the deficits 
seen in ASD relating to this kind of self referential cognition (SRC) is beginning to emerge. 
Many questions relating to SRC and its relationship to social cognition await further research. 
The present thesis is situated in the context of these questions and explores quantitative and 
qualitative differences in adolescents with ASD relating to the generation of self-images (e.g. 
concepts of self such as “I am a male, I am a hiker, I am kind) through use of a novel fluency 
paradigm (The “I Am” and “(s)he is” tasks) based on the Twenty Statements Test (TST; Kuhn 
and McPartland, 1954).  
 
This chapter will first provide an overview of Autistic Spectrum disorders and the theoretical 
perspectives available in understanding their causes and symptomatology, with an emphasis 
on social cognition theories. I will then introduce research and theoretical issues relating to 
“the self” and its close connection to memory, before reviewing findings relating to the autistic 
self and self-referential cognition (SRC) and related autobiographical memory research. Finally 
I will consider the connection between SRC and social cognition before presenting a 
programme of research for the present thesis.   
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1.2. AUTISM 
1.2.1 The changing faces of Autism 
 
The term ‘autism’ did not exist one hundred years ago. The condition was defined almost 
simultaneously by Leo Kanner and Hans Asperger, working independently, in the 1940’s. It 
took until the 1970’s, however, before the first specialist journal on autism was published: 
Journal for Autism and Childhood Schizophrenia. In the 1970’s, the rate of Autism was cited as 
4 in 10,000 and the condition was seen as ‘categorical’- people either met criteria for a 
diagnosis, or they did not (Gilberg, 1991).  
 
This categorical condition, or ‘classic autism’, was based largely on Kanner’s work and 
comprised of: 1) social difficulties e.g. lack of interest in people; inappropriate non-verbal 
gestures connected with eye contact and physical distance; aloofness; difficulties accepting 
other perspectives; difficulties understanding, reading  and responding to other’s emotions, 
thoughts and intentions, 2) Communication abnormalities e.g Echolalia; neologisms; 
understanding speech in a literal way; language delay; inappropriate use of speech in social 
situations 3) Repetitive behaviour and narrow interests e.g. Hand-flapping; spinning; obsessive 
interests; lining things up; constant repeating of behaviours and restrictive routines; severe 
tantrums and anxiety at change and a need for sameness; unusual memory and other isolated 
areas of intelligence. Additional features were also noted, such as: “learning difficulties; high-
risk of epilepsy; self-injury and hypersensitivity to sounds, textures, tastes, smells and 
temperatures” (Kanner, 1943; reported in Baron-Cohen, 2008). 
 
The ‘categorical’ perspective was first challenged by Lorna Wing, who introduced Hans 
Asperger’s work to the English-speaking world in 1981. Hans Asperger had concentrated on a 
different set of features to those comprising classic autism, including: “no language delay; 
pedantic style of speech; precocious vocabulary development; narrow interests; preference for 
adult company rather than peer company; social oddities that seem either aloof or intrusive; 
desire for things to be done in the same way constantly; bossy and controlling; excellent 
memory and attention to detail with IQ in the average or above average ranges” (reported in 
Baron-Cohen, 2008). This subgroup was later recognised in 1994 and added to the Diagnostic 
and Statistical manual of mental disorders (DSM), aptly named ‘Aspergers syndrome’.  
 
 The addition of Aspergers syndrome was joined by two other subgroups, “atypical autism” 
(with characteristic features only partially present) and “Pervasive developmental disorder-not 
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otherwise specified” (PDD-NOS) (which usually consists in a milder form of the key features). 
Additionally, ‘high functioning’ autism (HFA), though not itself a diagnostic category, increased 
in parlance and was used to denote a diagnosis of autism with milder symptoms and/or 
‘normal’ cognitive abilities. Some use the term simply as a synonym for Aspergers syndrome.   
 
As a consequence, autism has been reconceptualised as a “spectrum of disorders”, bound 
together by certain key features yet differentiated in terms of severity, individual emphasis 
and presentation. Nevertheless, a “triad of impairments” hold over the whole autistic 
spectrum (Wing, 1996), relating to socialisation, communication and imagination 
(‘imagination’ here relates to “flexibility of thought” and encompasses difficulties in dealing 
with change, narrow interests, empathy and generalisation). Wing (1996) also highlighted the 
fact that social impairments come in different varieties, including the aloof, the passive and 
the ‘sociable but odd’.  
 
In contrast to the 4 in 10,000 prevalence rate of autism in the 1970’s, current estimates for 
Autistic spectrum disorders (ASD) are close to 1 percent, meaning that in Britain around half a 
million have been diagnosed with the disorder (Michel et al, 2010). There have been a number 
of public scares as to the reason for this increased prevalence, including a supposed link with 
the Measles, Mumps and Rubella (MMR) vaccine. This claim, though evoking widespread fear 
and panic and still a cause of concern among the public, has been unequivocally refuted in the 
scientific literature (e.g Uno et al, 2012; Flaherty, 2011). Rather, the reasons for the increased 
prevalence seem largely due to the shift to a spectrum view of autism (allowing the inclusion 
of milder cases), the addition of new subgroups (as related above) and also better recognition, 
better training and better services involved in the assessment of ASDs than ever before 
(Leonard et al, 2010). 
 
Today diagnosing a person with ASD usually takes 2 to 3 hours, and is based upon interviews 
and observation, usually with the input of a multidisciplinary team. Classic autism is often 
diagnosed by the age of three, and early signs include lack of ‘joint attention’ (such as engaging 
another’s attention through pointing); failing to follow an adult’s gaze; and not engaging in 
simple pretend play. Most typically developing children of 18 months can master these things 
whereas most autistic children cannot. There is often regression or lack of progress in language 
abilities, and autistic children may show intense interest in the mechanical and tactile features 
of toys or in lining toys up (Frith, 2008). In distinction, Asperger Syndrome is often not 
diagnosed until at least 6 years of age, and often much later than this, including in late 
adulthood (Baron-Cohen, 2008).  
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1.2.2 The causes of Autistic Spectrum Disorders 
 
Initial theories for the cause of autism were psychogenic, implicating a “lack of maternal 
warmth”; parenting that is cold, distant and rejecting (Kanner, 1949; Bettelheim, 1967). As 
Kanner (1949) expressed it, autistic children “were left neatly in refrigerators which did not 
defrost. Their withdrawal seems to be an act of turning away from such a situation to seek 
comfort in solitude”. This concept of “refrigerator mothering”, though somewhat persistent, is 
without foundation in the research literature. Today the consensus is that autism is a 
neurodevelopmental disorder with a strong genetic basis (Baron-Cohen, 2008; Frith, 2008).  
 
Genes inherited from one or both parents play a causal role in the development of the autistic 
brain. Twin studies have demonstrated that there is a 60-90% concordance rate of autism in 
monozygotic twins whereas there is only a 5-10% concordance rate in dizygotic twins (Bailey et 
al, 1995). Additionally, autism and related conditions run in families, as do echoes of the 
broader autism phenotype, particularly social and communication difficulties (Bernier, 2012). 
Research has identified several rare but high risk genetic variants associated with ASD, and 
several common variants as risk factors, but the interaction and combination of these genes 
remains difficult to understand at the present time (Mouren et al, 2012). Nonetheless, 
heritability is not 100% and so environmental components must play a role too. Existing 
evidence indicates a possible role for low birth weight (Losh et al, 2012) and vitamin D 
deficiency during pregnancy or early childhood (Kocovska et al, 2012), though by and large the 
environmental factors are as yet unidentified and little understood in their interaction with 
genetic predispositions (Dietert et al. ,2011).  
 
There is not yet a biological marker for diagnosing ASDs. However, existing evidence indicates 
atypical brain development pre and post natally, particularly impacting the processing of social 
information. Children with autism exhibit macrocephaly (head and brain growing faster) in the 
first few years of life (White et al, 2009). It is unclear what is causing this overgrowth. Other 
consistent findings include those with ASD having a smaller amygdala (involved in recognising 
and responding to emotions), hippocampus (key area in memory) and caudate nucleus and 
cerebellum (implicated in attention switching and coordination). Additionally, there is 
increased grey and white matter in the autistic brain, especially in frontal regions such as the 
dorsolateral and medial prefrontal cortex (PFC). There is also evidence for a decreased number 
of Purkinje cells in the cerebellum, and global electrical dysfunction (epileptiform EEGs) 
(Cavezian et al, 2012). 
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Functional neuroimaging studies show that when autistic individuals engage in tasks involving 
thinking about other people’s thoughts, feelings, emotions or intentions there is underactivity 
in areas comprising the social brain, such as medial PFC, Orbito-FC, Amygdala, Temporal-
Parietal Junction (TPJ), Superior temporal gyrus (STG), Inferior Frontal Gyrus (IFG), anterior 
cingulate cortex and precuneus. Finally, studies investigating brain connectivity have suggested 
abnormal functional and structural connectivity (Cavezian et al, 2012). Further neuroimaging 
evidence will be discussed in section 1.5.1. 
 
1.2.3 Psychological theories of autism: an overview 
 
Regardless of the current dearth of specific information regarding the causes and neurobiology 
of autism, an essential perspective for understanding autism would enable us to know what it 
is like to be autistic. This has been the endeavour of psychological theories of autism, 
attempting to explain the core deficits in social communication, social interaction and narrow 
interests/repetitive behaviour. In the final analysis, psychological theories will ultimately need 
to explain all autistic traits across the spectrum and to integrate with neurobiological theories. 
Though we are still some way from achieving that, there have been several promising 
psychological theories put forth. One of the main theories- lack of ‘Theory of Mind’ (TOM) or 
‘mindblindness’- will be considered later in connection with social cognition (Section 1.3), due 
to its centrality in the present study. Prior to this, an overview of other theories will be 
presented. 
 
1.2.3.1 The Executive Dysfunction theory 
 
Executive function (EF) is an umbrella term for several skills involved in the control of 
behaviour, such as planning, working memory, inhibition, shifting attention, and the initiation 
and monitoring of action. These functions are known to depend upon the frontal lobes, in 
particular the PFC. Executive dysfunction is characteristic of patients who sustain damage to 
the PFC (e.g. Jurado & Roselli, 2007).  
 
People with an ASD often exhibit deficits on EF tasks related to planning, cognitive flexibility 
and sometimes fluency (Hill, 2004). In regard to planning, deficits are seen on the Tower of 
London and related tasks, in which discs need to be moved between three pegs from a starting 
position to a goal state in as few moves as possible (Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999).  
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Another classic EF task is fluency- the ability to generate ideas or concepts with a time limit. 
Fluency deficits are seen in classic autism on tasks requiring the generation of novel responses 
such as words or ideas in a specified time limit (Turner, 1999; Beversdorf et al. 2011). Fluency 
tasks have long been used to give an indication of a person’s cognitive “access” to information 
under timed conditions, with varying degrees of implicit structure present in the task. For 
example, the “animals” category fluency task requires the generation of as many items (i.e. 
animals) in a minute, thereby giving a measure of access to semantic information. The 
phonemic fluency task (e.g. generate as many words beginning with the letter “S” as possible 
in one minute) provides less semantic structure and simply asks for the generation of words 
beginning with a given letter (Lezak et al, 2004), but nonetheless measures access to a critical 
lexical structure. EF’s are relied on in fluency tasks to set up instructions, monitor outputs and 
to create novel search strategies.  
 
In respect of Cognitive flexibility, deficits are seen in tasks such as on the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Task (WCST). Here cards must be sorted along one of three dimensions (colour, 
number or shape) according to unspoken rules learnt only through feedback as to whether a 
card has been placed correctly or not. The experimenter will shift rules without telling the 
participant. Children and adolescents with autism are highly perseverative, failing to learn the 
new rule and continuing to sort according to the first rule (Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999). These EF 
deficits are put forth as possible explanations for the repetitive and narrow behaviour seen in 
autism, particularly an inability to shift attention, as well as the difficulties in coping with 
change (Hill, 2004). 
 
The explanatory power of the theory is however limited in terms of giving an account of the 
central social impairments of autism. Moreover, the EF deficits are often inconsistent when 
viewed across the wider autistic spectrum. For example, children and adolescents with High 
Functioning Autism (HFA) and Asperger syndrome (AS) often do not show deficits in the 
planning tasks (Hill, 2004) or fluency tasks. Indeed, the findings on fluency tasks are 
increasingly shown to be inconsistent, with some finding a specific deficit in only category 
fluency tasks (“professions”) in an Adult AS group (Spek et al, 2009), whilst a majority of 
studies find no deficits in high functioning ASD adolescents and adults in respect of even 
category fluency tasks (Boucher, 1988; Crane and Goddard, 2008; Robinson et al, 2009; 
Kleinhans et al, 2005). These findings relating to fluency are of particular interest to the 
present thesis, which will utilise the fluency paradigm in creating novel experimental tasks 
connected with self-concepts and other-concepts (see thesis aims in Section 1.7). 
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1.2.3.2. Weak Central Coherence theory (WCC) 
 
This theory was first proposed by Frith (1989) in order to account for the unique profile of 
cognitive strengths and weaknesses seen in ASD. Indeed, superior visuospatial skills on tasks 
such as visual search and puzzle assembly tasks have been reported in ASD (Happe, 1994), 
whereas other visual tasks appear to be deficient, such as face processing (Dakin, 2005). The 
WCC theory describes such cognitive and perceptual biases by claiming that in ASD visual 
scenes are perceived as a sparse set of details as opposed to a congruent and meaningful 
whole, and as such they often fail in extracting a coherent global configuration. One of the 
theory’s strengths is that it attempts to make sense of the “islets of ability” in ASD, such as 
excellent attention and memory for details, and skills in a narrow topic, whilst simultaneously 
accounting for common diagnostic features of ASD such as “preoccupation with the parts of 
objects, and a literal understanding of language” (Happe & Frith, 2006). 
 
The WCC has been tested through paradigms such as the embedded-figure test (Shah and 
Frith, 1983), visual illusions tasks (Happe, 1996) and perhaps most extensively with Navon 
stimuli, such as a letter ‘A’ made up of tiny letter ‘H’s (Mottron et al, 2003). Biases are also 
seen in completing sentences such as “you can go hunting with a knife and ...” where ASD 
groups are more likely to answer ‘fork’ as opposed to “catch an animal”, showing a tendency 
for local versus global processing of the sentence (Happe, 2006). In a review of over 50 studies, 
Happe and Frith (2006) suggest that the supposed inability to process global information may 
actually be a bias rather than a deficit, for in the presence of explicit and overt instructions 
ASD groups tend to perform the same as neurotypical participants on global tasks. Moreover 
their analysis shows that local bias is not a side effect of EF deficits and seems to be 
independent of deficits in social cognition tasks. Consequently, whilst helping to understand 
unique aspects of the autistic presentation, WCC is incomplete as an explanation of the social 
impairments. 
 
1.2.3.3 The Magnocellular theory  
 
This relatively recent theory focuses on perceptuo-cognitive processes in autism and suggests 
that there is a specific dysfunction in the magnocellular visual pathway in the brain connected 
with processing motion, whereas the other major visual parvocellular pathway is intact (Milne 
et al, 2002, Spencer et al, 2000). In ASD this impairment generalises across several types of 
motion, including coherent and biological motion, response to optic flow and in the detection 
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of translational, rotational and radial motion, whereas deficits in other developmental 
disorders appear to be related to coherent motion only (Milne, Swettenham & Campbell 
2005). There is a potential connection between the magnocellular theory and the WCC theory 
(section 1.2.3.2), in that those exhibiting local bias in a task involving hierarchical figures had 
reduced motion sensitivity whereas those with a global bias had normal motion sensitivity 
thresholds (Milne et al. 2004). Further research is needed to confirm whether magnocellular 
integrity can be related directly to coherent motion detection, ASD severity, and for direct 
evidence of abnormalities in magnocellular neurons in ASD (Milne et al, 2005).  
 
1.2.3.4.The Social Motivation theory of autism (SMT)  
 
The social world exerts an influence upon most of us like no other area. Indeed, social 
motivation is subserved by dedicated biological mechanisms in the social brain and can be 
understood as an evolutionary adaptation to our highly collaborative environment: social 
information is prioritised by attention, social interactions are intrinsically rewarding, and a 
drive to maintain social relationships infuses interpersonal actions (Chevalier et al, 2012). SMT 
proposes that early impairments in social attention set in motion a cascade of developmental 
processes that finally deprive the child of sufficient social learning experiences, and that the 
decrease in “attentional weight” placed on social information further disrupts social skill and 
social cognitive development (Schultz, 2005). 
 
Recent evidence in support of this highlights a lack of social orienting in ASD. Indeed, 
diagnostic criteria, and descriptions of the first year of life demonstrate relative disregard of 
one’s own name, diminished eye contact and aloofness (Osterling et al, 2002). Additional 
evidence shows children with ASD, in comparison to controls, looking more at the background 
than at characters in social photographs (Riby et al, 2008), and ASD adults and adolescents 
fixating less on faces and eyes in films (Nakano et al, 2010). Indeed, preference for non-social 
geometric shapes in infants has recently been identified as a robust predictor of ASD (Pierce et 
al, 2011). 
 
In terms of ‘seeking and liking’, despite lower overall acceptance by peers, increased loneliness 
in children with ASD is either not reported or is not connected with the amount of social 
involvement (Bauminger and Kausari, 2000).  Moreover, a lack of pointing, bids for joint 
attention, spontaneous collaborative engagement and responsiveness to verbal praise are 
seen in children with ASD (Leekam and Ramsden, 2006). Social anhedonia is also prevalent in 
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adolescents with ASD (Chevalier et al, in press). In respect of social maintaining, it has long 
been anecdotally reported that ASD individuals are less influenced by impression 
management. Indeed, the presence of an experimenter had little influence on the ASD group 
ratings of an experimenter’s drawing, whereas it had significant impact on a control group. 
Moreover, this “flattery index” correlated negatively with social anhedonia (Chevalier et al, 
2012b). 
 
A key difference between SMT and social cognition accounts (see Section 1.3) of ASD is that in 
SMT the causal direction is from diminished social interest leading to diminished social 
cognition, whereas in social cognition accounts, such as Theory of mind (TOM)/Mindblindness 
(see Section 1.3), the difficulties in understanding the social world give rise to an eventual loss 
of interest in social interactions. In respect of this, we would expect the cause to be more 
prevalent than the effect in ASD presentations, however neither TOM deficits or lack of social 
motivation are universal (Chevalier et al, 2012 c, Wing 1996). The inability of any single 
psychological theory to account for all the symptoms of autism is only problematic however if 
we insist on a single theory rather than a multiple-deficit perspective of ASD. As time goes on, 
theories may become more integrated and complementary rather than opposing.   
 
1.2.3.5 The Empathising-Systemising theory of Autism (EST) 
 
This theory is an example of an integrative theory, which attempts to pull several elements of 
the autistic presentation together. Difficulties in social communication and understanding are 
understood with reference to “empathy”- both cognitive empathy (e.g. classic TOM/mind-
reading) and affective empathy (having an appropriate emotional reaction to another person’s 
thoughts and feelings). Affective empathy may depend more on the mirror neuron system also 
postulated to underlie some of the ASD deficits (Gallese and Goldman, 1998). The 
distinction between cognitive and affective empathy also relates to differences in ‘theory-
theory’ and ‘simulation theory' accounts of how we understand others’ mental states, which 
remains a controversy far from being resolved (Wilkinson et al, 2012). Theory-theory suggests 
we use theoretical posits to explain and predict behaviour, whereas simulation theory suggests 
we use our own self as an anchor to imagine ourselves in others’ positions and use the 
resonant states of our own minds to infer others’ mental states. Simulation theory is further 
discussed in section 1.5. 
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The systemising factor in EST relates to abilities that tend to be average or above average in 
ASD (Baron-Cohen, 2008). Systemising refers to the drive to construct and analyse systems. 
Evidence for EST is multi faceted and shows an Autism>Male>Female ability profile on several 
systemising tests such as Systemising Quotient (SQ), Intuitive Physics tests and embedded 
figures tests among others, whereas the converse Female>Male>Autism profile is seen on 
tests requiring empathy such as the Empathy Quotient (EQ), Faux pas test, Mind in the eyes 
test, friendship and relationship Quotient, (Evidence reviewed in Baron-Cohen, 2011).  
 
These findings have led to extensions of the EST theory to an ‘Extreme Male Brain’ theory of 
autism, attempting to explain these even stronger biases toward systemising over empathising 
than those found in normal males, and to account for the much increased prevalence of ASD in 
males. Indeed, classic autism has a male:female ratio of 4:1 (Chakrabarti and Fombonne, 2001) 
and as high as 11:1 in individuals with AS (Gillberg et al, 2006). Interested readers are directed 
to Baron-Cohen et al.’s (2011) review for some of the supportive biological evidence for these 
theories. 
 
1.3 SOCIAL COGNITION IN AUTISM 
 
1.3.1 The ‘Theory of Mind’ construct 
 
Socio-communicative impairments form the core of the autistic presentation. This section 
looks more closely at the primary social cognitive theory that has been used to explain these 
deficits in ASD. The theory builds on findings in developmental psychology relating to “Theory 
of Mind” (TOM). The TOM construct refers to the capacity to recognise, comprehend and 
make inferences regarding other peoples’ mental states. It encompasses the ability to 
‘represent’ mental states, and from this to explain and predict the behaviours of self and 
others: to ‘mentalise’ (Leslie, 1987). In other words TOM makes it possible to infer what 
others’ know, intend, believe and feel; to create ‘theories’ about the state of others’ minds- to 
have a ‘theory of mind’. 
 
1.3.2 TOM and Developmental Psychology 
 
The TOM paradigm largely evolved in the context of Developmental Psychology, where there 
appears to be a graded emergence of the ability to “mentalise” in children. Various 
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experimental measures have been developed to assess this ability, which vary in their degree 
of difficulty, presentation modes (verbal or visual), and more recently in their relative 
dependence on cognitive processing and affective processing (Muller et al, 2010, Shamay-
Tsoory et al, 2007).  
 
Broadly, children as young as 3-4 years can comprehend that another person may hold a belief 
that is incorrect (‘First-Order false belief’ or FOTOM ability, Wimmer and Perner, 1983). See 
the next section for an example of the Sally Ann false belief task. Around age 6-7 yrs children 
begin to pass so called Second-Order TOM tasks (SOTOM ability), which relates to being able 
to think about “what someone thinks about what someone else thinks”.   
 
Around age 9 to 11yrs, children develop more complex TOM abilities. These include 
understanding Social “faux pas” (tested with the social faux pas tasks, Baron-Cohen et al, 1997) 
and involve recognising when someone says the wrong thing without realising the 
inappropriateness of saying it, and “Indirect speech” tasks (understanding irony, sarcasm, 
metaphors and jokes). These more advanced tasks are thought to require “applied use of TOM 
inferencing” and are categorised as “TOM pragmatic tasks” (Mcdonald and Flanagan, 2004). To 
solve these tasks, inferences must be drawn from verbal and/or nonverbal behaviour arising in 
a specific social context; it involves more complex reasoning about the beliefs, emotions and 
intentions at play during interactions between characters; abilities that are summed up as 
“social perspective taking”. Indeed there is ample evidence that the development of TOM 
abilities within children show a fixed and universal (the same across cultures) sequence and 
trajectory (Wellman, 1990, Leslie, 1987).  
 
1.3.3  TOM as a modular ability 
 
There has been significant debate over whether TOM represents a specialised modular ability 
with a “dedicated cognitive mechanism” (Fodor, 1992) or whether the TOM ability draws on 
more general inferential abilities (Gopnik and Wellman, 1992). If TOM is a dedicated module, 
independent of more general cognitive functioning, we should expect to find evidence of 
dissociation: impaired TOM in the presence of intact cognitive abilities. Ideally, this should be a 
‘double dissociation’ with evidence of intact TOM alongside impaired general cognitive 
functioning too.  
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In a landmark study, Baron Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) employed the Sally-Ann False belief 
experiment with three groups of children: an autistic group (with IQ in the normal range), a 
Down’s syndrome group (presenting with global intellectual disability), and a normal control 
group. In this task, the child is introduced to two dolls, Sally and Ann, and it is confirmed the 
child knows the name of each doll. A skit is then enacted, where Sally hides a marble in her 
basket. Sally then leaves the room, and whilst she is away, Ann moves the marble from the 
basket into her own box. When Sally returns the child is asked the “belief question”: “Where 
will Sally look for the marble?”. The results revealed that approximately 80% of the autistic 
group failed the experimental task, whereas the majority of the Down’s syndrome group and 
all the normal controls passed the task. These and related findings have been taken to imply a 
“double dissociation” between TOM abilities and general intellectual functioning.  
 
Subsequent research has confirmed that people with ASDs generally have difficulties passing 
age-appropriate TOM tasks. Consequently a deficit in TOM, described as “mindblindness”, has 
often been cited as a primary hallmark of autism and the basis of the social and 
communication difficulties (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Kaaland et al, 2002). Adding further weight to 
the argument that TOM represents a “hard-wired” innate and highly specialised cognitive 
module are findings from other studies assessing children with William’s syndrome: these 
children exhibit preserved social understanding in the context of marked impairments in non-
social cognitive domains (Tager-Flushberg et al, 1998).  
 
1.3.4 TOM and Executive Functions (EF) 
 
TOM theories of autism clearly have close relationships with some of the other theories of ASD 
(reviewed in Section 1.2.3) such as the Social Motivation theory and the Empathising-
Systemizing Theory, however there is cognitive neuropsychological support for the idea that 
TOM is related to EFs (whilst not being reducible to EFs). Aboulafia-Brakha et al. (2010) 
conducted a systematic review of 24 articles relating to this topic of dissociation between TOM 
and EF in neurological group studies. They point out that the broad conception of EFs as “the 
abilities that enable autonomous, goal directed behaviours to be carried out” has more 
recently been refined to incorporate a more multifaceted conception (Jurado & Rosseli, 2007).  
 
In light of this, Aboulafia-Brakha et al. (2010) based their analysis on conceptions of EF derived 
from Factor analytic studies. These studies have distinguished EF subcomponents: Shifting, 
inhibition and updating (Miyake et al, 2000) and a fourth component, Access (Fisk and Sharp, 
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2004). Shifting denotes the ability to engage/disengage attention, Updating is related to 
working memory and requires constantly monitoring, updating and discarding information 
based on its relevance. Inhibition involves suppressing preponderant or automatic responses 
when necessary and is considered central to planning abilities. Access refers to the process 
involved in verbal fluency tasks and is believed to mediate access to semantic, lexical and other 
long-term memory representations (Aboulafia-Brakha et al, 2010). 
 
Aboulafia-Brakha et al. (2010) included for analysis only clinically-used TOM tasks (FOTOM and 
SOTOM stories, the Faux pas test, Happe’s stories, the Mind in the Eyes task, and cartoon 
tasks). They examined patterns of “congruency and incongruency” across the 138 crossings 
recorded between different TOM tasks and EF domains. En masse, 71% showed congruent 
results (either both impaired or preserved), while 29% showed incongruent results (more or 
less equally in both directions). On the basis of this and more fine-grained analyses, they 
concluded that despite EF and TOM being closely associated, they cannot be reduced to one 
function. They note that though this analysis demonstrates a close relationship between TOM 
and EF, the nature of this relationship is still not clear: it could be that there is a functional 
dependency (EF underlies many aspects of advanced TOM functioning) or it could be that 
deficits tend to co-occur due to the overlap of neuroanatomical circuits.  
 
In autism research, a study by Pellicano (2010) assessed the longitudinal relationships among 
three aspects of cognition in 37 children with an ASD relating to TOM (false-belief tasks), EF 
(planning, flexibility, and inhibitory control), and “Central Coherence” (CC; local processing) at 
“Time 1” and again after three years had passed. It was found that “Time 1” EF and CC skills 
were predictive of change in TOM task performance 3 years later, and this was independent of 
age, IQ, and “Time 1” TOM performance. Predictive relationships in the reverse direction were 
not found, and no developmental connections between EF and CC were found. These results 
suggest that early “domain-general” EF and CC skills have a central role in shaping the 
development of children’s TOM abilities. Taken together, these findings imply a close 
relationship between EFs and TOM abilities in autism, both neuro-cognitively and 
developmentally. It is not however possible to reduce TOM abilities to underlying EF abilities 
(Aboulafia-Brakha et al, 2010).  
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1.3.5 TOM and the socio-communicative impairments of autism 
 
As mentioned in the overview of psychological theories of autism (see section 1.2.3), ‘single 
cause’ explanations of autism are not considered tenable (Boucher 2011; Happe, 2006; 
Chevalier 2012). Consequently it is assumed that impaired TOM constitutes a contributory 
cause of the social-communicative impairments rather than other non-social, behavioural or 
often comorbid features of autism. Even here however, significant problems have challenged 
the impaired TOM hypothesis.  
 
Firstly, not all children with ASD failed the Sally Ann task in the original Baron-Cohen et al. 
(1985) study, which was a pattern confirmed in later studies (Happe 1995), challenging the 
ubiquity of TOM impairment. Additionally, Boucher (1992) showed that adults with HFA or AS 
can pass FOTOM and SOTOM tasks, yet remain socially impaired in everyday life. However, it 
has since been demonstrated that individuals with ASD learn to “hack out” appropriate 
responses on FOTOM and SOTOM tasks using compensatory reasoning (Happe, 1995). This 
reliance on compensatory reasoning suggests that the intuitive or specialised abilities upon 
which neurotypicals depend for TOM understanding are impaired in ASD.  Indeed, HFA and AS 
individuals remain impaired on more complex TOM tasks such as the “Strange stories test” 
that assesses the comprehension of non-literal language involving irony, sarcasm or metaphor 
(Happe 1994); “the Mind in the eyes test” in which the mood has to be identified from pictures 
of eyes only (Baron-Cohen, 2001) and the “Faux pas” task (described earlier, Baron-Cohen, 
1999).  
 
Additional challenges to TOM accounts include the finding that other groups of individuals fail 
TOM tasks, such as those with learning disabilities (Yirmiya et al, 1998) and those with sensory 
disabilities (Minter et al, 1998) yet do not display autistic like socio-communicative deficits 
(Boucher, 2012). Also, research points out that recognisable social impairments in autistic 
children emerge long before TOM is present in normal development (Klin et al, 1992). This 
however depends on a rigid definition of TOM relating to passing FOTOM and related tasks, 
whereas the term has broadened hugely and now relates interchangeably with ‘mindreading 
and mentalizing’ to refer to a range of processes involved in understanding others’ minds 
(Boucher, 2012). Whilst it is no longer possible to construe impaired TOM as the major cause 
of socio-communicative impairments in ASD, or to disentangle the complex causes and effects 
of this neurodevelopmental disorder, it nonetheless remains an important contributory cause 
(Boucher, 2012). Interested readers are directed to reviews in Belmonte (2009), Gallagher 
(2004) and Boucher (2012) for in depth discussions regarding the causal pathways possibly 
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underlying the core ASD deficits, and interactions between social motivation and social 
cognition theories. 
 
The present thesis will be exploring relationships between social cognition in ASD and 
experimental measures of self-referential cognition. To this end, various complex TOM tasks 
will be used, such as the mind in the eyes task, the Faux pas task and Character intentions task 
and the experimental Yoni task as indexes of social cognition abilities (described in detail in 
section 2.1.4). Recent research in autism has turned attention to differences not just in the 
processing of others’ mind, but in the processing of one’s own mind and mental states- that is, 
cognition that refers to the “self”. This research will be reviewed in the next section (1.4), and 
will set the stage for the aims of the present thesis.  
 
1.4 SELF REFERENTIAL COGNITION (SRC) 
 
1.4.1 The Self 
 
The idea of ‘the self’ is an absorbing topic and one which is philosophically extremely hard to 
conceptualise. Questions around whether ‘the self’ as the subject of experience, or as the 
‘knower’ of knowledge, can ever be itself known, examined or objectified (or even whether it 
exists) has been the subject of spiritual and philosophical  discourse for thousands of years. 
Indeed, the ancient Greek aphorism gnothi Seauton (“Know Thyself”) alludes to the centrality 
and primacy of this question in understanding human behaviour, thought, morals and life 
itself. The present thesis can do naught but nod in the direction of these issues and direct the 
interested reader to works that examine the nature of conscious experience and selfhood from 
a western philosophical perspective (Nagel 1979; Hofstadter & Dennett, 1981; Chalmers, 
1996,) and from eastern schools of thought such as Vedanta and Buddhism. The present thesis 
seeks to use a working definition of the self from a psychological perspective. Given that there 
is a shared understanding of the nebulous set of qualities and characteristics that make up a 
“self”, a cognitive and sociological investigation of its nature can uncover important 
information concerning it and its relationship to other psychological constructs, and indeed 
psychopathology and neurological impairment. 
 
 William James (1892/1961) made a key distinction between the self-as-object (The Me) and 
the self-as-subject (The I). The ‘Me’ constitutes everything that can objectively define the self 
including “material characteristics” (e.g. physical embodiment and possessions), “social 
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characteristics” (roles, relationships and personal attributes) and “psychological/spiritual 
characteristics” (mental mechanisms, consciousness and thoughts), (Jackson et al, 2012). In 
contrast ‘the I’ relates to the experiential aspects of the self and is subjective (including 
Agency, Distinctness, Continuity and Self-Reflection as experiential characteristics). Broadly 
speaking, ‘the I’ denotes the self involved in initiating, organising and interpreting experience 
and which is crucial for the development of “personal identity” (Damon and Hart, 1988).  
 
In this sense, “the I” (subjective self) is necessary for a “Me” (personal identity) to exist at all. 
Only when the self becomes an “object” of experience- “a Me”- can one be ascribed “self-
awareness”. Butterworth (1995) distinguishes between “primary self awareness” when the self 
is an object of one’s own “perception”, and “higher-order self-awareness” when the self is the 
object of one’s own “cognition”. Gillihan and Farah (2005) make a further distinction between 
physical and psychological aspects of self identity. It seems reasonable to separate experience 
and cognition relating to one’s own body and experience and cognition relating to one’s own 
mind (Williams, 2010). I shall return to these distinctions in more detail in section 1.4.3.1. By 
and large, the present thesis is concerned more with the “me” than with the “I”. That is, it is 
concerned with cognition relating to the self-as-object, or “self-referential cognition” (SRC). 
 
1.4.1.2 Multi-dimensional selves 
 
The self has been viewed from narrative, constructionist, social-constructionist and relational 
perspectives (Harter, 2012). Indeed what holds these perspectives together is the notion that 
the self is not unidimensional, but instead is composed of multidimensional constructs and 
processes (e.g. Goldberg, 1990). In this sense the self is envisaged as a host of distinct yet 
overlapping “self-schemata”,  embedded in rich social contexts, and comprising many 
cognitive representations developed from various autobiographical memories (AM) as well as 
more semantic representations such as “I am a student”. The ‘self constructs’ generated at any 
given moment from these “self-schemata” are both context dependent and fluid. As one 
example, Wang (2008) showed that when Asian American’s were primed with their Asian self 
as opposed to their American self, they generated memories and self-descriptions that were 
more socially oriented and less self-focussed than those primed with their American self.  
 
The numerous forms of self-conception could be broadly classified in terms of the self-as-
objects distinctions described in section 1.4.1 (James, 1892/1961, Jackson et al, 2012). James 
further suggested that individuals organise “the Me” into a hierarchical structure, with relative 
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importance assigned to each material, social and psychological constituent. Indeed, more 
recent hierarchical models of the self have also emphasised a distinction between “central” 
and “peripheral” self conceptions, determined by the relative degree of descriptiveness and 
importance (Rosenberg, 1979). Interestingly, peripheral self-conceptions are processed more 
slowly and show greater fluctuation relative to mood than do central self conceptions 
(Sedikides, 1995). 
 
In spite of the multidimensional, dynamic and context dependent nature of the self, most 
people have the experience of an integrated, unified self. Epstein (1981) considered this “unity 
principle” as one of the most basic needs of an individual. Though postmodern theorists tend 
to view this continuous and stable self as illusory, in large part due to its multidimensional 
nature (Gergen 1991), it is clear that a continuous and stable sense-of-self is critical for 
everyday functioning (Maslow, 1954; Rogers, 1951), and is the basis of personal identity 
(Erikson, 1950). More recent theorists have posited the view that it is possible to maintain a 
“transmodern” view of the self (Vitz, 2006) which “transcends” the fragmentation of self 
implied by postmodern social constructionist perspectives with a view of the self as emergent, 
changing, yet with identifiable and understandable core patterns all of which give meaning to 
one’s existence. A philosophical account of these issues is unfortunately beyond the scope of 
this thesis however.   
 
Instead, the present thesis will explore the multiple self-constructs spontaneously used by 
neurotypical people (NT) and people with ASD to define themselves and others. In this sense, 
the self is seen as comprising many separate self-constructs and self-images (e.g. Conway 
2005) connected with any number of the self-as-object categories (James 1892/1961, Jackson 
et al, 2012). These issues will be discussed in greater detail in section 1.4.3.2. First however it is 
important to review the intimate relationship between the self and aspects of memory and 
cognition.   
 
1.4.2 The Self and Memory 
 
A concept of self implies memories of the self upon which to base those concepts. Indeed, 
memories pertaining to the self are called autobiographical memories (AM), and they form the 
basis for identity and a context in which identity change can occur (Conway et al, 2002). AM 
also supports a sense of the “temporal continuity of identity” through connecting the current 
self with past memories (Addis and Tippett, 2004).  AM is a form of long term memory (LTM), 
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and it is widely accepted that one fundamental distinction in LTM is between “episodic” and 
“semantic” declarative memory, based upon functionally distinct neuro-cognitive systems 
(Tulving, 2001). Episodic memories are memories of events experienced first-hand in a distinct 
place and time and are associated with “autonoetic awareness”- the subjective sense of being 
aware of one’s continuity through time. Semantic memory on the otherhand is defined as 
memory of decontextualised, “timeless” facts connected with “knowing” but not autonoetic 
awareness (Tulving, 1984). 
 
Though AM and episodic memory are closely connected, they are not synonymous. Lind (2010) 
makes a distinction between 4 types of memory with relevance to the self: “a) episodic AM 
(e.g. remembering one’s last birthday celebration), b) episodic non-autobiographical memory 
(e.g. remembering what happened on last nights soap opera), c) semantic autobiographical 
knowledge (knowing one’s surname) and d) semantic non-autobiographical knowledge (e.g. 
knowing the alphabet)”. Lind (2010) argues that episodic AM requires a self-concept at 
encoding (tagging the memory as “self-relevant”) and at retrieval (re-experiencing the self as 
the object of experience (‘the me’). However, non-autobiographical memory does not require 
a self-concept at encoding and only tacitly involves re-experiencing the self as the subject of 
experience (“The I”) at retrieval. Lind (2010) suggests autonoetic awareness may differ 
qualitatively between these two types of episodic memory.  
 
The self concept (made up of distinct self-constructs and self images, e.g. I am white, I am a 
father, I am kind) is largely based upon semantic autobiographical knowledge (SAK). Here the 
self-concept acts as a “fixed referent” and category around which new AMs are organised. It 
would not be possible to encode new AMs as “self relevant” without this self-concept. Indeed, 
there is evidence that both self-concept and episodic AM co-occur at around age 2 (Harley and 
Reese, 1999). However the development of a self-concept is unlikely to be the sole factor 
involved in the development of episodic AM. Improvements in “memory binding” are also 
implicated in the development of episodic memory (Sluzenski et al. 2006). This “binding 
together” of the multiple features comprising an episode involves linking them at encoding 
and bringing them back together at retrieval (Baddeley 2000) including an ‘autonoetic 
awareness’ of the past state of self. This fact may certainly have relevance to ASD where Weak 
central coherence (WCC) is indicated (Frith, 1989, see section 1.2.3.2). I shall shortly consider 
important effects seen in memory research connected with self referential cognition, and how 
they differ in ASD (namely the Self-reference effect, section 1.4.4.2). First however, an 
overview of the self in autism will be presented. 
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1.4.3 The Self in Autism 
 
ASDs are named after the ancient greek “autos”, which translates as “self”. Indeed early 
characterisations by Kanner (1943) described aspects of the condition as “extreme 
egocentrism” leading to “autistic aloneness”. From the very beginning then it has been 
suggested that “the self” is fundamentally altered in ASD and is strongly implicated in the 
deficits underlying social and communicative abilities.  As was outlined in the social cognition 
section 1.3, people with ASD are impaired in understanding minds and in ‘mentalising’ (Baron-
cohen et al, 1985). Moreover, this deficit is not reducible to general problems with meta-
representation (distinguishing events and reality) as ASD participants are unimpaired on tests 
of “out of date” pictorial representations (false pictures) but remain impaired on “out of date” 
beliefs tasks (false beliefs) (Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1992). As discussed earlier, the 
“mindblindness” theory of autism remains one of the primary cognitive explanations for the 
deficits seen in representing others’ minds, and the present section now looks at evidence for 
deficits and differences in representing their own minds.  
 
It would be improbable to suggest that ASDs involve not having a “subjective experience” of 
the self (“the I”) at all, though it is possible that these experiences are qualitatively different 
from those of NTs. Indeed, Hurlburt, Happe and Frith (1994; reported in Williams et al, 2010) 
used an “introspective sampling method” to assess reports of internal experiences of HFA 
adults. Three adults wore a device that blipped at random moments throughout the day, and 
the subject was required to write down what they were thinking about immediately prior to 
the blip. One adult had good TOM skills and was able to report his own thoughts relatively 
easily, another had mixed TOM skills and mixed ‘reporting’ skills and the third adult had poor 
TOM skills and was unable to do the task at all. Furthermore, all the reports that were given 
consisted entirely of “visual images”, whereas for NT people thoughts are found to be verbally 
mediated 80% of the time (Hurlburt, 1990). The evidence is somewhat mixed around the use 
of “inner speech” in ASDs (e.g. see Joseph et al, 2005, Lidstone et al, 2009). Nonetheless these 
findings highlight some of the potential differences in the self-as-subject processes in ASD. The 
focus of the remaining evidence reviewed in this thesis focuses on the difficulties of becoming 
aware of the self-as-object (i.e. the “Me”) for individuals with ASD.  
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1.4.3.1 Self awareness in ASD 
 
One useful distinction, described earlier, is between physical and psychological aspects of the 
self (Gillihan and Farar, 2005). In respect of physical self-awareness, Williams (2010) reviews 
four studies that have explored mirror self-recognition amongst children with ASDs. These 
tasks involving marking the child’s face with a coloured spot and seeing how they respond to 
their reflection. Touching the spot implies that they have a “body schema” of how their own 
face usually looks like and which is mapped onto the one seen in the mirror. Williams (2010) 
found that 74% of children with autism were successful in this test. A further physical mark of 
the self is the sense of agency and ownership of action. Behavioural studies find no differences 
in ASD individuals with respect to action monitoring or attribution (David et al, 2008) or 
visuospatial perspective taking (David et al, 2010). These studies show that physical self-
awareness seems to be intact and relatively strong in ASD individuals.  
 
In terms of psychological self awareness the picture is somewhat different. It is well known 
that children with ASD show difficulty in using 1st person pronouns (Lind and Bowler, 2009), 
and even HFA individuals show lessened awareness of their own emotions (Silani et al. 2008), 
mental states including recognising their own intentions (Williams & Happe, 2010) and ASD 
traits (Johnson et al, 2009). Lind (2010) suggests that these difficulties in psychological self-
awareness are “downstream consequences” of the socio-communicative deficits seen in ASD. 
She also suggest that these deficits, compounded by reduced opportunities for effective social 
interactions, leads to a lack of self-knowledge in the psychological domain which in turn leads 
to significantly less elaborate self concepts. This idea is explored next. 
 
1.4.3.2 Self concepts in ASD 
 
Hobson and Lee (1998) used Damon and Harts’ (1988) “self understanding interview” (SUI) to 
explore self-understanding. Their results found impairment in social and psychological aspects 
of the self-concept in children with ASD. In a recent extension of these findings, Jackson, 
Skirrow & Hare (2012) have explored self-understanding using the SUI in adolescents with 
Aspergers syndrome.  The model of self-concept used for coding in the SUI stems from William 
James (1892/1961) theories on the experiential domains of the self, and divides the self into 
two main components, the “self-as-object” (me), and the “self-as-subject” (I), described 
earlier. Jackson et al. (2012) used a coding scheme in this study which has formed the basis of 
a coding scheme utilised in the present thesis for an experimental measure of self-concepts 
31 
 
and other-concepts. I shall therefore report the coding scheme used in the Jackson et al, 
(2012) study here: 
 
The “self-as-object” chunks were coded into four distinct categories:  
“1) Physical – this includes an individual’s body and material characteristics 
     2) Active- this includes an individual’s activity-related abilities e.g. a biker, a walker 
  3) Social- this includes attributions and schema relating to social interactions and   
  social relationships 
    4) Psychological- this includes the individual’s ability-related emotions, thoughts,   
          preferences or other cognitive processes.”  
 Jackson et al. (2012). 
 
In respect of the self-as-object self concepts, Jackson et al. (2012) found that the Asperger 
group generated less self-characteristics overall than the control group, and showed a distinct 
pattern of reporting significantly less psychological and social descriptions of themselves, but 
no difference in the number of physical self-characteristics reported, and some suggestion of 
less responses in the active category. These findings strongly conform to the pattern of 
findings described above showing intact and “normal” physical self awareness and related 
representations, but impoverished psychological self awareness. This distinction appears then 
to hold downstream in the relative poverty of psychological and social self-concepts compared 
to physical self-concepts and understanding (Hobson & Lee, 1998, Jackson et al. 2012). A 
central aim of the present thesis will be to further explore self-concepts in ASD using novel 
fluency tasks, described later. 
 
1.4.3.3 Conceptualising the self of  others in ASD: Stereotyping 
 
ASD deficits in holding theories of other minds and in psychological self awareness would seem 
to suggest the likelihood of other differences in processing social information such as in social 
stereotyping. This would be further predicted on the basis of “atypical face processing” widely 
demonstrated in ASD (Grelotti, Gauthier, and Schultz, 2002; Rosset et al, 2009) as well as 
deficits in reading emotions in faces, such as in the Mind in the eyes task (Baron-cohen, 2001; 
Kalland et al, 2008). Stereotypes are a type of categorisation providing one means of enabling 
us to predict others’ behaviour. Social stereotypes emerge robustly in childhood and are 
known to play a central role in social interaction (for a review see Mackie et al, 1996). One of 
the most documented and robust stereotypes is the “Beauty is Good” (BIG) stereotype, where 
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children and adults attribute “goodness” and other positive traits (e.g. greater intelligence, 
competence) to attractive rather than to unattractive faces (see review in Langlois et al, 2000). 
Similar stereotypes around emotions and happiness (“Happy is Good” HIG) are also seen (Hess, 
Adams & Kleck, 2008). 
 
Surprisingly few studies have explored social stereotypes in ASD populations. One study 
examining gender and race stereotypes found that ASD children appear to make stereotypical 
judgements in a similar manner to NTs (Hirschfeld et al, 2007). A more recent study by 
Fonseca, Santos, Rossett & Deruelle (2011) presented ASD and NT children faces and asked 
them to judge how friendly and intelligent the faces appeared. The results revealed that the 
ASD group produced BIG stereotypes in a similar manner to the NTs, with both groups 
considering attractive faces as more friendly and intelligent. These preserved social 
stereotyping abilities seem surprising in the context of impaired TOM and Psychological self 
awareness seen in ASD. One aim of the present thesis was to explore social stereotypes further 
in ASD, by assessing spontaneous judgements made about attractive versus unattractive faces, 
and happy versus sad faces (see section 2.3.3.5).  
 
1.4.4 Memory and the Autistic Self 
 
A close relationship between Autobiographical Memory (AM) and the self has been described 
in section 1.4.2. Lind (2010) made a distinction between episodic AM (EAM) and Semantic 
Autobiographical Knowledge (SAK). Section 1.4.3 highlighted selective impairments in the 
autistic self-concept related to SAK, in that initial research indicates psychological and social 
self-concepts in ASD appear to be diminished whilst physical self-concepts are intact (Jackson 
et al. 2012). Further evidence for differences in AM and in the paradigmatic “self-reference 
effect” are considered in next. 
 
1.4.4.1 Autobiographical memory (AM) 
 
Crane and Goddard (2008) assessed HFA adults with matched NTs across several 
autobiographical tasks: 1) an interview task asking questions such as “can you tell me 
something that happened while you were at primary school that stands out in your mind?” 2) 
Fluency task involving participants generating as many events (EAM) and people’s names (SAK) 
from selected lifetime periods in ninety seconds 3) Narrative tasks eliciting “detailed 
descriptions” such as “what did you do for your last birthday?”. The interview task did not 
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elicit any ASD differences. However, in the fluency task the ASD group showed impaired EAM. 
No differences were found on the SAK fluency or on general fluency tasks (on either letter or 
category fluency, described in section 1.2.3.1). This suggests the group differences were not 
due to “generativity based” explanations. In the narrative task the ASD participants produced 
significantly less specific EAMs. 
 
The above study is of particular interest to the present thesis due to its use of a fluency 
measure to assess AM. The present thesis will assess self-concept directly through a novel 
fluency measure (see later). Crane and Goddard (2008) found significant differences on EAM 
fluency but not SAK fluency (people’s names). However Bruck et al. (2007) whilst assessing HFA 
children also found deficits in SAK for personal facts when asking questions such as: “What’s 
your father’s name?”). Goddard et al. (2007) have suggested that impaired EAM is related to 
impoverished self-concepts in that the self-concept is insufficiently structured to act as a fixed 
referent to ‘organise and tag’ self-relevant experiences. Alternative explanations may include 
relating impaired EAM in ASD to poorer “binding”. This would connect with the WCC theory 
and would imply atypicalities in related brain structures connected with memory such as the 
Hippocampus, Medial temporal lobe, amygdala and related connections with the frontal lobes 
(Bowler, Gaigg and Lind, 2011). These considerations are yet to be systematically explored, 
however. 
 
1.4.4.2 The Self Reference Effect (SRE) 
 
The Self reference effect (SRE; Rogers, Kuiper & Kirker, 1977) relates to the firmly established 
finding that memories encoded in relation to the self are enhanced relative to other 
memories. The SRE is thought to relate to the “encoding specificity hypothesis” (Tulving and 
Thompson, 1973) which suggests enhanced memory when encoding conditions match retrieval 
demands. Symons and Johnson (1997) construed the self as a “well developed cognitive 
structure that promotes the organisation and elaboration of knowledge” and which 
consequently promotes compatible encoding and retrieval conditions. The kinds of cognitive 
structure involved at encoding give rise to various specific degrees or depths of processing, 
and so in this sense the SRE is an extension of the “depth-of-processing” effect (DOP; Craik and 
Tulving, 1975). If self-concepts are impoverished in ASD it would be reasonable to assume that 
the encoding of self-relevant information will also be effected. In this section, findings for a 
reduced SRE in ASD in memory paradigms will be considered. These effects are particularly 
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interesting from the point of view of the present thesis, which will be exploring SREs more 
directly in relation to self-concepts versus other-concepts (see later). 
 
In her review- Memory and the self in autism, Lind (2010) reports studies by Toichi et al. 
(2002), Lombardo et al, (2007) and Henderson et al. (2009) in connection with the SRE in ASD 
groups. An overview of these studies is also presented here. Toichi et al. (2002) explored DOP 
and SREs in 18 HFA adults compared to age and IQ matched controls. They were shown 30 
target words (personality trait adjectives e.g. “sensitive”). Prior to the presentation of each 
target word, they were asked one of three questions: 1) Phonological condition with least 
DOP: “Does the word rhyme with?” 2) Semantic condition: “Is the meaning of the word similar 
to?” and 3) Self-reference condition with the most DOP: “Does this word describe you?”. This 
task was then followed by a “surprise recognition test” in which the individuals were asked to 
select the target words from amongst new words. The control group showed the usual DOP 
and SREs (Phonological < Semantic < Self-referring) whereas the ASD group showed significant 
DOP (Phonological < Semantic) but not SREs (Semantic ≈ Self-referring). It should be noted 
however that the ASD and controls did not differ significantly in terms of total number of word 
recognised for semantic or self-referring words.  
 
Lombardo, Barnes, Wheelwright & Baron-Cohen (2007) explored DOP and SREs in 30 HFA 
adults and 30 age and IQ matched controls with a similar paradigm to Toichi et al, (2002). 
Participants made judgements concerning the descriptiveness of trait adjectives (using likert 
scales) to 1) Themselves 2) best friend 3) Harry Potter (dissimilar non-close other) and 4) 
syllables contained in the trait words. Following the “surprise recognition task” it was found 
that ASD group performed similar to controls on Syllables and Harry Potter but significantly 
poorer in the Self and best friend conditions. However, in this study both groups showed DOP 
and SRE effects (Syllable < Potter < Friend < Self). Lombardo et al. (2007) compared the 
“difference scores”  for Self vs Potter conditions as an indicator of SRE effect size, and found 
that the ASD group had a smaller SRE that approached statistical significance (p=.068). 
Henderson et al. (2009) used a similar methodology in HFA children and found the same DOP 
effect but no SRE effect in the ASD group whereas the control group showed the usual SRE. In 
a further analysis of the self vs Potter scores they showed a significantly smaller SRE than 
comparison children (Henderson et al, 2009). These SRE findings are often cited as showing a 
diminished access to self relevant information in ASD. 
 
35 
 
1.5 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SRC AND SOCIAL COGNITION 
 
Evidence for social cognition impairments in ASD was presented in section 1.3, and indications 
of important differences relating to self-referential cognition were considered in sections 1.4.3 
and 1.4.4. Both types of cognition depend on representing “minds”, either one’s own mind or 
anothers’ mind. The present section will look at evidence from NT people and ASD in respect 
of whether these (dis)abilities are related. 
 
1.5.1  A Neuropsychological Perspective 
1.5.1.1 Neurotypicals  
 
Self-referential cognition (SRC), particularly involving evaluation of oneself, has been 
connected to the “cortical midline structures” (Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004). For example, 
the ventromedial PFC shows increased activation during tasks requiring judging whether 
personality trait adjectives describe the self of not (Kelley et al, 2002). Moreover, tasks 
involving “self knowledge” (i.e. SAK) also activate the anterior rostral medial FC, which is 
known to be engaged during “mentalising” (Amodio and Frith, 2006). Indeed, SRC and social 
cognition demonstrate substantial overlap in the cortical midline structures (Tamir & Mitchell, 
2010). This has led some researchers to suggest that these areas may subserve simulation 
mechanisms (connected with simulation theory) that are recruited in using one’s own mind to 
understand others’ minds (Gallese, 2003).  
 
Indeed, the ventromedial PFC has been found in NTs to respond preferentially to information 
that is self-relevant as opposed to other-relevant (particularly non close but familiar others, 
such as Harry Potter), (Kelley et al, 2002; David et al, 2006; Pfeifer et al, 2007). This preference 
in the Ventromedial PFC for self-relevant information is found even when thinking about 
others’ impressions of ourselves (Ochsner et al, 2005; Izuma et al, 2008). These findings make 
the Ventromedial PFC a central neural mechanism in distinguishing self from other and in the 
coding of “self-information”. Lombardo et al. (2010) suggest that this “neural distinction 
between self and other enables us to appreciate the similarities and differences between our 
own and others’ minds”. This is central to simulation theories, in that successful mentalising, 
empathising and appropriate social behaviour all rely upon the use of “the self” as the fixed 
referent and “anchor point” for modelling others’ minds  (Epley et al, 2004). 
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1.5.1.2  Autistic Spectrum Disorders 
 
Kennedy and Courchesne (2008) have found reduced Ventromedial PFC activation across 
personality trait judgements involving both self and other, in ASDs compared to NTs. 
Moreover, a recent metaanalysis of 24 neuroimaging studies (allowing estimation of the 
likelihood of activation of certain areas during social processing) found the medial PFC to be 
underactive in ASD compared to NTs (Di Martino et al. 2009). Finally, Lombardo et al. (2010) 
employed FMRI whilst asking ASD and NTs to make “reflective mentalising” or “physical 
judgments” about either themselves or the British Queen (a familiar non close other). In line 
with the above studies in NTs, they found the usual greater activation in the Ventromedial PFC 
for self versus other (the Queen) processing. However, the ASD participants did not show 
differential responses in this region for self versus other judgements. ASD participants showed 
an absence of this neural “self-reference effect” (SRE). Moreover, the magnitude of the neural 
self-other distinction in the ASD group whilst mentalising was strongly related to the 
magnitude of early childhood social impairments in autism, such that the greater the early 
social impairments the smaller the neural SRE.  
 
These findings strongly suggest that atypical neural circuitry, especially the reduced role of the 
ventromedial PFC coding for self-relevant information, is central to both the self-referential 
and social impairments seen in ASD (Lombardo et al, 2010). Given the complexity of ASD 
however, and the wide range of symptoms found, it is likely that disruptions in interactions 
within and between large-scale brain networks as opposed to simple focal deficits are needed 
to account for all the symptomatology (Uddin & Menon, 2009). 
 
1.5.2 The “Absent Self” hypothesis 
 
The co-occurrence of both self-referential and social cognition deficits in ASD have led to the 
proposal of the “absent self” (Frith 2003; Baron-Cohen, 2005; Hobson et al. 2006 reported in 
Lombardo et al, 2010). Rather than suggesting a total lack of self, it relates to the idea that a 
specific kind of self awareness, perhaps involved in administering “top-down” control, may be 
absent in ASD. In connecting this idea to neuropsychological data, Lombardo et al. (2010) 
noted that focal lesions in the ventromedial PFC have ruinous consequences for social 
behaviour (Beer et al, 2006). They suggest that the absence of this higher-order self awareness 
may have consequences in ASD such as difficulties in appreciating the “dual nature of oneself 
in the social world, as an agent who is both similar to and yet different from others” (frith 
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2003; Hobson et al. 2006). This would be another facet of the kinds of deficits in 
“psychological” self awareness explored in sections 1.4.3.1 and 1.4.3.2. It also suggests that we 
would expect to find a relationship between self-referential and social cognition deficits.  
 
These ideas are a relatively new area in autism research, and to date studies exploring self 
referential processing and its relationship to social cognition in ASD are sparse. There are some 
indications however. In the study reported earlier Lombardo et al. (2010) found a connection 
between the neural SRE and social impairment in childhood. Further to this, Lombardo et al.’s 
(2007) study exploring the SRE across the self, friend, harry Potter and syllables (reported in 
section 1.4.4.2) provides some additional evidence. They found that self-referential and social 
cognition are inextricably linked. Firstly, within the SRE memory paradigm, they found that 
mentalising abilities accounted specifically for performance in the self-condition but not in the 
best friend-condition or the syllable-condition (this was indicated through adding the Mind in 
the eyes test as a covariate which removed group differences in self condition only). 
Additionally, in both the ASD and control groups, they found that as performance in the self 
condition increased, performance on the eyes test also increased and the endorsement of 
autistic traits decreased (measured by the Autistic Spectrum Quotient (AQ)- Baron-Cohen et al. 
2001). These findings are of particular note for the present thesis, which will also be exploring 
the relationship between measures of self-referential and social cognition in ASD. 
 
1.6 MEASURING THE SELF 
 
As discussed in section 1.4.1, the self is notoriously hard to define. This also makes it extremely 
difficult to measure. However, by carefully construing the sense of self under investigation, 
valid studies can be undertaken. The present study is concerned more with the self-as-object 
(the me) than the self as subject (the I) (James 1892/1961). In particular, it is concerned with 
exploring self-concepts in NT adolescents and those with ASD. From the perspective of the 
self-as-object, the self is clearly not a unitary concept but a multidimensional and multifaceted 
set of self-images (e.g. I am male, I am a father, I am kind). Though it is possible to measure 
the self-images directly, it is important to bear in mind the intimate link with memory, 
explored in sections 1.4.2 and 1.4.4. Self images and concepts are a form of semantic 
autobiographical memory (SAK).  
 
In order to use self-images in research, a method of collecting them is needed. For example, 
the “Tennessee Self Concept Scale” (Fitts, 1965) asks individuals to rate statements for “self-
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descriptiveness”. Jones, Sensenig & Haley (1974) have noted problems with such “rating” 
methods however in that they restrict individuals to pre-determined items and may not 
provide categories of self-definition that are meaningful to a persons’ set of self-concepts. 
Alternative methods are more open-ended allowing individuals to describe freely their sense 
of self. One such task is the “Twenty statements Test” (TST, Kuhn and McPartland, 1954). 
Individuals are asked to complete a series of statements beginning “I am...” allowing them to 
draw on trait knowledge (a form of SAK) and more narrative information (e.g. I am training to 
be a clinical Psychologist). Such open ended methods are intuitively appropriate for measuring 
a construct as complex, diverse, multidimensional and personal as “the self” (Mcguire & 
Padawer-Singer, 1976). 
 
Indeed, there has been a recent upsurge of interest in ‘the self’ as a cognitive structure (e.g. 
see Klein, 2012), and a corresponding increase in the use of cognitive paradigms attempting to 
measure ‘the self’, especially in relation to memory (for a review, see Conway 2005). The 
generation of ‘I am’ statements, very similar to those generated in the TST, have been 
employed as one method to explore the role of ‘the self’ in human memory. For instance, 
Rathbone, Moulin & Conway (2008) used self images generated from ‘I am’ cues to explore the 
accessibility and organisation of memories connected with it. They found that memories 
generated from “I am cues” clustered around the ‘time of emergence’ of that particular self 
concept and remained highly accessible later in life.  
 
Such paradigms have shown that ‘the self’ exists as a powerful organisational structure in 
human memory, including for representations of past and future events (Rathbone et al, 
2011).  It has also illustrated “intact” self-function for people with epilepsy and head injury 
(Rathbone et al, 2009; Illman et al, 2011), insofar as ‘the self’ operates to organise what few 
autobiographical memories are available.  Though a detailed review of this research is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, it illustrates that the generation of ‘I am’ statements has been 
particularly useful as a measure of ‘the self’ in experimental memory paradigms. The present 
thesis aims to extend the basic “I am statement” method in order to more directly measure 
the accessibility of self concepts and the types of self-concepts generated. 
 
One difficulty with open-ended methods such as the TST is that they can be hard to 
appropriately quantify and score objectively (Strong and Feder, 1961). These problems can be 
overcome however through using either validated coding schemes (e.g. the eight categories of 
Rhee et al, 1995) or through using theoretically driven distinctions and classifications. The 
present thesis is an instance of the latter and will employ an adaptation of Jackson et al.’s 
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(2012) coding scheme to a novel fluency version of the TST (The I Am task). This is theoretically 
motivated on the basis of key distinctions in self awareness and self concept explored in 
sections 1.4.3.1 and 1.4.3.2. 
 
1.7 AIMS OF THE THESIS 
 
The central aim of the thesis was to explore self-concepts and other-concepts in ASDs and NTs 
with novel fluency measures that enable both quantitative and qualitative assessment. More 
specifically, to ascertain whether the timed open ended generation of self-statements (see the 
“I Am task”, section 2.1.1) would show a self reference effect (SRE) in comparison to the 
generation of other-statements (see the (s)he is tasks, section 2.1.2), and to assess whether 
these statements differed qualitatively (e.g. whether the statements  were physical, social or 
psychological self-concepts; see section 1.4.3.2).  
 
Study 1 explores these novel fluency measures in a piloting sample of NT adolescents and 
Study 2 assesses the quantitative and qualitative differences between an ASD group and an 
age and IQ matched NT group of adolescents. Study 2 had two additional aims. First, to explore 
social stereotyping in ASDs and NTs (such as the “Beauty is Good” (BIG) and the “Happy is 
Good” stereotypes, see section 1.4.3.3) through an analysis of the other-statement tasks. And 
second, to explore whether potential quantitative and qualitative differences between ASDs 
and NTs in generating self and other statements are related to measures of social cognition in 
the “Theory of Mind” paradigm.  
 
In summary, the research questions for each study are as follows: 
 
Study 1  
 
What are the quantitative and qualitative differences between the open ended generation of 
self-statements and other-statements in a large NT pilot group? Is it possible to measure the 
generation of self concepts using ‘I am’ cues which present psychologically meaningful results, 
interpretable in a self framework? Can a self-reference effect be found in a series of identity 
statements produced in fluency tasks? 
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Study 2:  
 
Pilot Study 1 indicated Fluency tasks were a meaningful and useable measure of the 
accessibility of self concepts, and so Study 2 went on to ask: ‘what can they uncover regarding 
the self in ASD?’ More specifically: 
 
a) What are the quantitative and qualitative differences between an ASD and NT group in 
generating self and other statements?  
 
b) What are the differences between an ASD and NT group in spontaneously generating social 
stereotypes? 
 
c) What is the relationship between the generation of self/other statements and TOM 
measures? 
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2.0 THE STUDIES 
 
Moses: “Who are you?”.  God: “I Am that I Am” 
-a paraphrase of Exodus 3:14 
 
2.1 Overview and rationale of the key tasks in Study 1 and Study 2 
 
This section introduces the experimental tasks designed for the present thesis. As stated in the 
thesis aims (section 1.7), the main purpose of these measures was to enable quantitative and 
qualitative assessment of self and other concepts through open-ended fluency measures.  
2.1.1 The I Am task 
 
The ‘I Am’ fluency task is an adaption of the “twenty statements task” (TST, Kuhn and 
McPartland, 1954, see section 1.6). The TST is open ended, requesting participants to generate 
“I am” statements in response to the question: “who am I?”. This approach enables 
participants to define their own sense of self in their own words, giving free scope to focus on 
any selection of the numerous and multifaceted self-images that a person may have. The 
twenty generated ‘I am’ statements are then coded using one of several available scales, for 
example, Rhee et al.’s (1995) eight categories: “traits, social identities, specific attributes, 
evaluative descriptions, physical descriptions, emotional states, peripheral information, and 
global descriptions”. The I Am fluency task differs in that the participant performs the task 
under timed conditions, with just one minute to generate as many self-statements as they can. 
Additionally, the number of coding categories for the “I am” statements has been simplified 
(see section 2.1.1.1).  
 
Fluency tasks were introduced in section 1.2.3.1. They have long been used to give an 
indication of a person’s cognitive “access” to information under timed conditions, with varying 
degrees of implicit structure present in the task (Lezak et al, 2004). For example, semantic 
category fluency tasks require the generation of as many items (e.g. pig, cow, goat) in a given 
category (e.g. “animals”) in one minute. The category thereby provides semantic structure to 
the task. Findings on Category fluency measures in ASD are revisited below in section 2.1.3.  
 
Goddard and Crane (2008) found reduced fluency on a task tapping episodic autobiographical 
memory (EAM) but not on a fluency measure tapping semantic autobiographical memory (SAK; 
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people’s names) in an ASD group (the study was discussed in section 1.4.4.1). They suggested 
impaired self-concepts as a possible explanation for the impaired EAM seen in this study 
(Goddard et al. 2007), though other hypotheses include deficits in memory binding (Bowler, 
Gaigg and Lind, 2011). Though Goddard and Crane (2008) didn’t find impaired SAK fluency for 
peoples’ names connected with AMs in ASD, the present I Am fluency task involves tapping 
SAK (and possible EAM) that is more complex and multifaceted in nature. Indeed, the I Am task 
attempts to tap self-concepts directly, and thereby involves more complex and elaborated self-
knowledge.  
 
In the I Am task the self is essentially construed as a single construct, though multidimensional, 
and is left loosely defined. The task instructions have however been modified to allude to 
some of the different categories that self-statements might relate to (see Appendix 1).  
Nonetheless, response options are left open and each participant is encouraged to respond in 
whatever way seems most appropriate to them. Consequently the I Am task provides a 
measure of both quantitative and qualitative significance, yielding fluency totals that can be 
coded into distinct self categories.  
 
2.1.1.1 Coding  
 
Jackson et al. (2012) studied self understanding in adolescents with aspergers using the “self 
understanding interview” (SUI; Damon and Hart, 1988). This study was reported in section 
1.4.3.2. They used a coding scheme based upon William James (1892/1961) theories on the 
domains of the self divided into the self-as-object (me) and self-as-subject (I) components, see 
section 1.4.1. It is the “self-as-object” chunks that incorporate qualities that objectively define 
the self and which make up a person’s self-concepts, and it is with these that the present study 
is concerned. Jackson et al. (2012) had found that in the SUI the asperger group generated less 
self-characteristics than the control group, and showed a distinct pattern of reporting 
significantly less psychological and social descriptions of themselves whereas there was no 
difference in the number of physical self-characteristics reported. 
 
The I Am fluency task has been designed with the aim of providing an index for quantitative 
differences in fluency and qualitative differences in the nature of self statements generated 
between NT adolescents and those with an ASD.  It also enables comparison across different 
types of fluency task (e.g. category fluency tasks and (s)he is fluency tasks). In terms of coding 
categories, Jackson et al.’s (2012) study provides a simplified yet no less cogent model for the 
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coding of self-statements than Rhee et al.’s (1995) eight categories (often used in conjunction 
with the TST). Moreover, these categories have yielded significant differences in ASD 
populations on the SUI (Hobson and Lee, 1998; Jackson et al, 2012). 
 
In respect of these considerations, the I Am fluency statements were coded into Physical, 
Social and Personal (psychological) categories corresponding to three of the four self-as-object 
categories used in Jackson’s study, see section 1.4.3.2. One difference however is that the 
“Active” category in Jackson’s study, relating to individuals’ activity-based abilities, has in the 
present study been incorporated under the “Social” categorisation, in so far as it largely relates 
to a socially defined ability or active role (e.g. a biker, a poker player). This further simplifies 
the coding model. See Appendix 2 for a description and examples of coding rules used with the 
I Am and (s)he is fluency tasks. 
 
2.1.2 (S)he is picture fluency task 
 
This novel task has been designed to tap the fluency of participants in mapping the self of 
“other” people. The task follows the same general principles as the I Am fluency task, except 
that instead of making statements about themselves, the participant is asked to generate 
statements about known and unknown persons in 6 distinct pictures (one minute per picture, 
so that the (s)he is task comprises 6 task conditions). As part of the instructions, participants 
are encouraged to make any type of attribution that they consider appropriate, including what 
they imagine the person to be like (see instructions in Appendix 1). 
 
The main impetus behind creating this task was to explore potential differences in fluency 
between self (I am task) and other ((s)he is task). In particular, to discern if a self-reference 
effect (SRE) is present with participants finding it easier to generate more statements about 
themselves than known and unknown others (see section 1.4.4.2), and to explore if there are 
any qualitative differences in the self-as-object attributions (physical, social and personal) 
commonly made for self, known and unknown others (see section 1.4.3). In brief, the aim of 
Study 1 was to explore these considerations in a normal population sample of 99 participants, 
and Study 2 aimed to test experimentally if there are significant differences between NT 
adolescents and those with an ASD. 
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 2.1.2.1 Six Picture Conditions 
 
Two “known” pictures were chosen for the task: Harry Potter and the Queen. These choices 
reflect the existing usage of these known others in related memory research (e.g. Lombardo et 
al, 2007; Henderson et al, 2009; Lombardo et al, 2011). In short, Lombardo et al. (2007) found 
a reduced SRE in the self vs Harry potter encoding conditions in an adult ASD group compared 
to matched controls, Henderson et al. (2009) found no SRE effect in the same comparison with 
HFA children (see section 1.4.4.2), and Lombardo et al. (2011) found distinct differences in 
neuro-cortical self and other (British Queen) representation between ASD and control groups, 
for example demonstrating an absent “neural SRE” in the ASD group (see section 1.5.1.2). 
 
Four “unknown” pictures were taken from an online database, two male and two female. A 
happy and a sad male face, and an attractive and unattractive female face were chosen based 
on existing ratings of happiness and attractiveness for these faces (data available from the 
online database, see Oosterhof & Todorov,  2008). Alongside providing “unknown other” 
fluency task conditions, these pictures also enabled exploration of potential differences 
relating to happiness and attractiveness dimensions.  
 
Robust findings in the literature relating to social stereotypes were reported in section 1.4.3.3. 
In particular, they document the “Beauty is Good, BIG” stereotype, where attractive faces are 
more likely to be judged as friendly and intelligent and where unattractive faces are more 
likely to be judged as unfriendly and unintelligent (Langlois et al, 2000). Similar stereotypes 
exist for happiness and goodness (HIG; Hess, Adams & Kleck, 2008).  
 
In one of the first studies to look at this issue, Fonseca et al. (2011) found a similar BIG 
stereotype in an ASD group compared to an age and IQ matched group of children when 
judging pictures of faces (see section 1.4.3.3). This is a little surprising, given the hallmark 
deficit of difficulties in social understanding, interaction and development seen in ASD. An 
additional aim of study 2 was therefore to explore whether differences are present between 
NT adolescents and those with an ASD in spontaneous social stereotyping across the 
“unknown” (s)he is tasks. To this end, responses for the unknown pictures will be qualitatively 
assessed and coded for comparison on the basis of spontaneous BIG and HIG stereotypes (see 
Study 2). The 6 pictures are presented in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
 
45 
 
 
Figure 2.1. The six pictures of the (s)he is tasks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Harry Potter The Queen 
Happy Unattractive 
Attractive Sad 
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2.1.3 Category Fluency (Animals) Task 
 
This commonly used verbal category fluency task (Benton and Hamsher, 1978) has been 
included as an index of general fluency abilities. Participants are asked to generate as many 
different animals as they can in one minute. Findings for ASD populations regarding verbal 
fluency are mixed. Some find deficits in semantic and phonemic fluency in High functioning 
autistic children (Turner, 1999) adolescents and adults (Beversdorf et al, 2011) and others a 
specific deficit in only semantic category fluency tasks (“professions”) in an adult asperger 
group (Spek et al, 2009). Other studies find no deficits in high functioning ASD adolescents and 
adults in respect of semantic category fluency tasks (Boucher, 1988; Crane and Goddard, 2008; 
Robinson et al, 2009; Kleinhans et al, 2005). The weight of this evidence would suggest that in 
an HFA adolescent population, “animals” category fluency would not be markedly impaired. 
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2.2 STUDY ONE 
 
2.2.1 Aims 
 
The aim of Study 1 was to investigate fluency and self-as-object attribution type (physical, 
social or personal) across the “I Am” task and the 6 picture conditions of the “(S)he is” task in a 
large NT adolescent population. The main emphasis of Study 1 was on piloting the 
experimental fluency measures and to index any self-reference effects (SREs) and/or other 
observed effects across the task conditions. SREs are robustly seen in memory research 
(Rogers, Kuiper & Kirker, 1977; see section 1.4.4.2). Here “the self” is construed as a well 
developed cognitive structure which acts as a fixed referent around which self-concepts and 
other memories are organised and elaborated (Symons and Johnson, 1997). This is thought to 
increase the depth-of-processing at encoding and the related ease of cognitive access and 
recall for memories and concepts connected with “the self” (Craik and Tulving, 1975). 
Consequently it is predicted that participants in this study will show an SRE in terms of 
significantly greater fluency for the self compared to other conditions.   
 
2.2.2 Method 
 
2.2.2.1 Participants 
 
99 healthy volunteers were recruited for this within subject design. The study was approved by 
University of Leeds Research Ethic Committee. Volunteers were recruited through cooperation 
with a Leeds based Secondary School. All volunteers were students who took part in school 
form time, for 10 minutes, upon written agreement of the school head teacher acting as “in 
loco parentis” as well as verbal consent of parent and student. All students were between 12.5 
and 15.5 years of age (mean 13.7, SD: 0.61), and 48 were female and 51 male.  
 
2.2.2.2 Procedure 
 
Participants were verbally instructed as per the guidelines in Appendix 1. The Animals fluency 
task was administered first, followed by the I Am task and then the 6 conditions of the (s)he is 
task. These tasks have been described in sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2. A teacher assisted in the 
collection of data for the pilot study and he was trained in person allowing for clarification and 
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in order to ensure the written guidelines (see appendix 1) were understood accurately. The 
data for the I Am and (s)he is tasks were coded into physical, social and personal categories by 
a colleague at the University of Leeds as per the instructions and table in Appendix 2. Together 
with a third colleague, we discussed a sample of coded answers to ensure we interpreted the 
coding system in the same way. Furthermore, for a minority of responses in the pilot data 
where my colleague felt there was some ambiguity, she marked the answer for attention and 
we agreed together on an appropriate category.  
2.2.3 Results 
 
The central aim of the study was to index an SRE in terms of total fluency scores across all the 
fluency tasks. Moreover it was also intended to explore differences in the fluency totals for the 
3 distinct types of attribution (physical, social, personal) across the I Am and (S)he is tasks. In 
order to do this, a repeated measures 7 x 3 (Task x type) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was first 
conducted to ascertain main effects and interaction effects. This was followed by 3 separate 
ANOVAs for each of the attribution types (each with 7 levels of task) so as to gain a clearer 
picture of the interaction effects. Finally, fluency on the I Am and (S)he is tasks was compared 
to fluency on the animal category fluency task using paired sample t-tests and bivariate 
correlations.  
 
2.2.3.1 Repeated measures ANOVA 
 
For the initial analysis, a within subjects 7 x 3 ANOVA was conducted in order to detect 
possible differences in fluency between the 7 task conditions and the 3 types of attribution 
(Task x Type).   See Table 2.1 for a summary of the descriptive statistics from the data analysis. 
Note that where Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity has been violated, 
the Greenhouse-Geisser correction has been reported. All effects are reported as significant at 
p < .001 level. 
 
There was a significant main effect of Task condition, F(5.1, 498.2) = 54.97 p<.001, Attribution 
Type F(1.5, 143.8) = 80.30, p<.001 and a significant Task*type interaction effect, F(7.9, 779.6) = 
43.3, p<.001. Due to the multitude of potential contrasts, these main effects and interactions 
were interpreted based on Table 2.1 and individual contrasts and effect sizes of those 
contrasts (see tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4). To obtain all the relevant contrasts, 3 separate ANOVAs 
were calculated for each of the three types: physical, social and personal, with Bonferroni 
corrections to allay family-wise error. Note that effect sizes have been calculated correcting for 
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the pairwise correlations between tasks in this within subjects design, enabling more accurate 
future comparisons with other studies and between subjects conditions (Morris & Deschon, 
2002). 
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Table 2.1. Summary of fluency scores for the different task conditions and attribution types, 
means and (SDs), from Study 1. 
 
Task Condition  Attribution 
Type 
  
 physical social personal Total 
I Am task 
 
2.68 (1.53) 1.52 (1.59) 4.22 (2.49) 8.39 (2.73) 
Known Harry Potter 2.02 (1.70) 2.16 (1.24) 1.95 (1.91) 6.09 (2.12) 
Known Queen 
 
2.41 (1.83) 2.31 (1.20) 2.15 (1.80) 6.84 (2.09) 
Unknown Unattractive 2.82 (1.67) 0.11 (0.37) 2.83 (1.67) 5.75 (2.03) 
Unknown Attractive 
 
3.15 (1.77) 0.10 (0.35) 2.25 (1.73) 5.48 (2.06) 
Unknown Happy 3.61 (1.64) 0.13 (0.41) 1.51 (1.31) 5.23 (1.64) 
Unknown Sad 
 
3.60 (2.19) 0.44 (0.71) 2.32 (1.70) 6.34 (2.21) 
Animal task    14.24 (3.91) 
     
     
 
 
Table 2.1 indicates some clear general patterns across the fluency scores. In terms of total 
fluency and the significant main effect of Task, The I Am task (8.39) has a greater fluency total 
than all the (s)he is tasks (means ranging from 5.23 to 6.84). This is indicative of a clear Self 
Reference Effect (SRE). A similar pattern seems to hold for the personal attributions but not for 
the physical and social attributions. These patterns are examined in more detail in the 
separate contrasts that follow. A graphic representation of these fluency scores by task and 
type can be found in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2 to show mean fluency scores across all types and tasks in Study 1 
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2.2.3.2 Physical attributions 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA with 7 levels of Task was significant F(6, 588) = 21.89, p<.001. To 
help understand the effect of task on the generation of physical attributions, table 2.2 shows 
the significant pairwise contrasts and the effect size of the differences. Effect sizes provide a 
more meaningful summary of the contrasts than the differences in marginal means (means are 
reported in Table 2.1).  
 
In terms of physical attributions, Figure 2.2 indicates that there are more physical attributions 
for the unknown pictures (particularly happy and sad) than for Harry Potter, the Queen and 
the I Am task. Indeed, as indicated in Table 2.2 Harry Potter has significantly less physical 
attributions than unattractive (d= 0.42), attractive (d=0.62), happy (d=0.88) and sad (d=0.81), 
all p<.001. With the exception of unattractive (d=0.21) the pattern of significant differences is 
very similar for the Queen (d=0.41, d=0.67 and d=0.59 respectively, p<.001). These significant 
effect sizes are in the medium and large ranges. Furthermore, Harry Potter, the Queen and the 
I Am task are not significantly different from each other, with the exception of a small effect 
size difference between the I Am task and Harry Potter (d=0.34, p< .05).  
 
In respect of the Study 1 aim to index a self-reference effect, we can see that for physical 
attributions the only evidence is for I Am task vs Harry Potter (d=0.35, p< .05). In fact the 
pattern reveals that participants tend to generate more physical attributes for unknown 
people than themselves, with significantly fewer physical attributions for the I Am task than 
Happy (d=0.57. P<.001) and sad (d=0.43, p< 0.01), and no significant differences to attractive 
and unattractive pictures. 
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Table 2.2 A table to show the effect sizes (Cohen’s d) for differences in marginal means 
across pairwise task comparisons for physical attributions.  
 
Note: effect sizes are calculated on the basis of the paired sample t-statistic and the correlation between 
conditions. A correction for the correlation is important, otherwise effect sizes are overestimated and 
unsuitable for comparison with other studies (Morris and Deschons, 2002, equation 8). * indicates 
significant at the p <.05 level, and ** indicates significant at the p< .01 level. Positive values equal the 
item in the column being greater than in the row. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Physical 
Attributions 
    
Task Condition I Am Harry Queen Unattract Attractive Happy 
Known Harry Potter  0.35*      
Known Queen 
 
 0.14  -0.23     
Unknown Unattractive  -0.07  -0.42**  -0.21    
Unknown Attractive 
 
 -0.25  -0.62**  -0.41**  -0.24   
Unknown Happy  -0.57**  -0.88**  -0.67**  -0.54**  -0.34*  
Unknown Sad 
 
 -0.43**  -0.81**  -0.59**  -0.46**  -0.32  0.01 
       
54 
 
2.2.3.3 Social Attributions 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA with 7 levels of Task was significant F(6, 588) = 121.60, p<.001. 
Table 2.3 shows the significant pairwise contrasts and the effect size of the differences in 
fluency for social attributions. 
 
In terms of social attributions, Figure 2.2 indicates significantly more social attributions for the 
“known pictures” (Harry and the Queen) than the other tasks. Harry Potter and the Queen are 
not significantly different from each other. Table 2.3 confirms significantly more social 
attributions for Harry Potter and the Queen than all other tasks, with huge effect sizes 
compared to all the unknown pictures (ranging from d=1.34 to d=1.97), and small to medium 
effect sizes compared to the I Am task (d=.35 and d=.40 respectively). The I Am task similarly 
shows significant and large effect size differences with all the unknown pictures (ranging from 
d=.69 to d=1.14). There is some variation in the unknown pictures, where “sad” shows 
significantly more social attributions than the other unknown pictures, with medium effect 
sizes (ranging from d=.45 to d=.52, p< 0.01). 
 
In respect of indexing a self-referencing effect, we do not see an SRE in comparing the I Am 
task to Harry Potter and the Queen. In fact, significantly more social attributions are apparent 
for the known others (Harry and the Queen) than for all other tasks.  However, there are 
significantly more social attributions for the I Am task than unknown others. In the social world 
then, the results indicate a greater number of social attributions made about known others 
than about the self. However there is an SRE with respect to unknown others. 
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Table 2.3 A table to show the effect sizes (Cohen’s d) for differences in marginal means 
across pairwise task comparisons for social attributions.  
 
* indicates significant at the p <.05 level, and ** indicates significant at the p< .01 level. Positive values 
equal the item in the column being greater than in the row. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Social Attributions     
Task Condition I Am Harry Queen Unattract Attractive Happy 
Known Harry Potter  -0.35*      
Known Queen 
 
 -0.40** -0.11     
Unknown Unattractive  1.06**  1.90**  1.90**    
Unknown Attractive 
 
 1.14**  1.88**  1.97**  0.03   
Unknown Happy  1.01**  1.77**  1.34**  -0.06  -0.01  
Unknown Sad 
 
 0.69**  1.66**  1.58*  -0.52**  -0.51**  0.45** 
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2.2.3.4 Personal Attributions 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA with 7 levels of Task was significant F(6, 588) = 33.79, p<.001. 
Table 2.4 shows the significant pairwise contrasts and the effect size of the differences in 
fluency for personal attributions. 
 
In terms of personal attributions, Figure 2.2 clearly indicates more personal attributions for the 
“I Am” task compared to all the known and unknown pictures. Indeed this is significant for all 
contrasts (see Table 2.4), p<.001, and the effect sizes are mainly large (ranging from d=0.59 to 
d=1.10). Moreover, Harry and the Queen are not significantly different to each other or the 
unknown pictures, with the exception of small effect size differences with Unattractive (d=0.38 
and d=0.35 respectively, p<.05) and between the Queen and Happy (d.38, p<.05) pictures. 
Amongst the unknown pictures, Happy shows significantly fewer personal attributions than 
the other pictures, with medium effect sizes (ranging from d .49 to d .68, p<.001). Here we find 
clear evidence of a self-referencing effect, with much greater fluency for personal attributions 
in the I Am task than all other tasks. 
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Table 2.4 A table to show the effect sizes (Cohen’s d) for differences in marginal means 
across pairwise task comparisons for personal attributions.  
 
  Personal 
Attributions 
    
Task Condition I Am Harry Queen Unattract Attractive Happy 
Known Harry Potter  0.9**      
Known Queen 
 
 0.8**  -0.09     
Unknown Unattractive  0.59**  -0.38**  0.35*    
Unknown Attractive 
 
 0.78**  0.14  0.05  0.37*   
Unknown Happy  1.10**  -0.23  0.38*  0.68**  0.49**  
Unknown Sad 
 
 0.76**  -0.16  0.09  0.32*  0.05  0.5** 
       
* indicates significant at the p <.05 level, and ** indicates significant at the p< .01 level. Positive values 
equal the item in the column being greater than in the row. 
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2.2.3.5 Comparisons with Category fluency 
 
The animal fluency task enabled a comparison of the generation of attributes across the I Am 
and (s)he is tasks with a commonly used fluency measure. The animals category fluency task 
correlated significantly with the total fluency score across all other tasks, with medium 
correlations (r=.267 to r=.449, p<.01). The sole exception to this was ‘Animals’ with Harry 
Potter, which was nonetheless very close to significance (r=.181, p=.07). This finding indicates 
that performance on the I Am tasks and (s)he is tasks were significantly related to more 
general fluency abilities. A full table of the correlations can be found in Appendix 3. 
 
The central focus of Study 1 was on the generation of self attributes in the I Am task and its 
design construction as a fluency measure. Therefore additional comparisons were made with 
the Animals task. Overall, the I Am task total fluency score had a large and significant 
correlation with the animals task (r=.429, p<.001). Regarding the types of attribution, fluency 
of both personal and social attributions correlated significantly with the animals task (r=.248 
and r=.218 respectively, p<.05). Fluency with physical attributions did not correlate 
significantly (r=.083).  
 
A paired samples T-test compared the means across fluency totals for the I Am task and the 
Animal task. Participants produced significantly more attributions for Animals (M=14.24, 
SE=0.39) than in the I Am task (M=8.39, SE=0.27), t(98) = 15.8, p< .001, d=1.65, indicating a 
very large effect size. Overall, these findings indicate that the I Am task is significantly related 
to fluency abilities (particularly in terms of generating social and personal statements). It is 
however a more difficult task than animals category fluency, as indicated in the very large 
effect size difference between I Am total fluency scores in comparison to the animals category 
fluency task.  
 
2.2.4 Discussion of Study 1 
 
The main effect of Task revealed a significant SRE with the “I Am” task showing greater fluency 
than all the (s)he is conditions. This SRE was however specific to attribution type, with more 
personal attributions in the I Am task than the (s)he is tasks, with mainly large effect sizes.  This 
indicated that participants were able to access more self-as-object concepts in the personal 
domain for themselves compared to other people. We can therefore index a clear SRE in total 
fluency and fluency for personal attributes in a NT adolescent population.  
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This SRE did not hold for physical and social attributes however. Indeed, the results here 
indicate that in connection with social attributes, participants generated significantly more 
social attributions for known others than in the I Am task and all unknown others.  Knowledge 
of Harry Potter and the Queen in the social world appears to make it easier to access 
information about their social identity and roles than for unknown others (large effect sizes). 
Though more social attributes are made for Harry and the Queen compared to the self (I Am 
task), this may reflect the fact that personal attributes are more accessible in the self and are 
possibly prioritized over social attributions. We can however index increased salience in social 
attributions for known others compared to unknown others. 
 
In respect of physical attributions, the pattern is more mixed. There is an indication that 
participants generated more physical attributions for unknown others compared to known 
others and oneself. This effect was more pronounced for Happy and sad than for the attractive 
and unattractive pictures. In the dearth of social knowledge about other selves, participants 
were more likely to focus on physical attributes than social or personal ones for unknown 
others. Conversely, it is likely that for the known others and for the self, social and personal 
attributes respectively are more salient and are given priority over physical attributions. 
Overall, this appears to lead to increased generation of physical attributions toward unknown 
others than in other task conditions.  
 
The findings indicated that the I Am task is also a much harder fluency task in comparison to 
the Animals category fluency task, with a very large effect size. Category fluency performance 
was significantly correlated with fluency performance across all other tasks except Harry 
Potter, indicating the role of general fluency abilities in I Am and (s)he is fluency performance. 
 
Overall, Study 1 has enabled the indexing of some clear findings in respect of cognitive access 
and generation of self-concepts. The I Am and (s)he is fluency measures, utilizing ‘I am’ and 
‘(s)he is/picture’ cues, demonstrated clear quantitative findings in connection with SREs and 
fluency scores. They also highlighted some clear qualitative differences across task conditions 
in terms of the types of self-concepts generated, according to the physical, social and personal 
coding framework. In short, fluency measures have proved a workable measure of access to 
self concepts, and the coding framework has uncovered distinct differences across task 
conditions. Attention is now turned to the main experimental Study 2 where these fluency 
measures were used to explore differences in generating self concepts between NT 
adolescents and those with an ASD.   
 
60 
 
2.3 STUDY TWO 
 
2.3.1 Overview and Aims 
 
Recent research into ASDs have begun to report impairments in self-referential cognition 
(SRC), such as reduced or absent SREs for self vs known others at recall in memory paradigms 
(e.g. Lombardo et al, 2007; Henderson et al, 2009, see section 1.4.4.2). Also, research into self-
awareness in ASD suggests a selective deficit in psychological as opposed to physical self 
awareness (Williams, 2010, see section 1.4.3.1), and initial research incorporating the Self 
understanding interview (SUI; Damon and Hart, 1988) with ASD populations has found reduced 
reporting of psychological and social descriptions of themselves but typical reporting of 
physical descriptions (Hobson and Lee, 1998; Jackson et al, 2012). Finally, Goddard and Crane 
(2008) found impaired EAM fluency but typical SAK fluency in ASD. They advanced 
impoverished self-concepts as a possible explanation for the EAM impairments (see section 
1.4.4.1). These findings tie in with the recent “absent self” hypothesis for ASD, connecting the 
emerging findings in SRC with the long established social cognition deficits (Frith 2003; Baron-
Cohen, 2005; Hobson et al. 2006, see also section 1.5.2). However, contrary to what might be 
expected on the basis of a lack of selfhood and TOM abilities seen in ASD, a study examining 
social stereotyping found no differences between ASD and NT children in making the “Beauty 
is Good, BIG” stereotype (Fonseca et al, 2011, see section 1.4.3.3). The aims of Study 2 were 
situated in the context of this research. 
 
The present thesis has involved developing direct open-ended fluency measures of self and 
other concepts. Study 1 piloted these new I Am and (S)he is fluency tasks in 99 NT adolescents. 
The findings revealed a clear SRE in terms of a greater total fluency on the I Am task compared 
to the (S)he is tasks.  It was shown that the SRE was largely connected with increased personal 
attributions in the I Am compared to the (S)he is tasks and other clear findings with respect to 
attribution type were also found. The fluency measures therefore seem suited to exploring 
potential SRE and attribution differences between NT adolescents and those with an ASD. 
 
The main aims of Study 2 were to explore whether a lack of selfhood in ASD adolescents could 
be seen in terms of an absent or reduced SRE in comparison to an age and IQ matched control 
group, and to investigate potential group differences in the types of attributions made 
(physical, social, personal) across the I Am and (s)he is tasks. These aims were addressed first 
in the results sections 2.3.4.1 to 2.3.4.4. A further aim of Study 2 was to explore whether there 
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are differences in spontaneous social stereotyping between groups i.e. to see if there are 
differences in “Beautiful Is Good” (BIG), HIG and related stereotypes. These issues are covered 
next in the results section 2.3.4.5. Finally, Study 2 aimed to explore possible relationships 
between measures of social cognition (advanced TOM tasks: Mind in the eyes, Character 
intentions task, Faux pas task and the experimental Yoni task, all described in section 2.3.2) 
and differences in Self-referential cognition, and these issues are covered last in the result 
section 2.3.4.7. In connection with these aims, the following hypotheses were made on the 
basis of existing literature. 
 
2.3.1.1 Hypotheses 
 
Firstly, there will be a reduced SRE in the ASD group (i.e. smaller differences between self and 
known other fluency). This prediction is based primarily on paradigms in memory research that 
demonstrate a reduced SRE in ASD populations between self and known others (e.g. Lombardo 
et al, 2007; Henderson et al, 2009).  
 
Secondly, the ASD group will generate less social and personal attributions than the control 
group across all fluency tasks. This is predicted on the basis of Jackson et al.’s (2012) study 
using the SUI which found significantly less social and psychological (personal) statements in 
an asperger group, but not less statements about physical characteristics. It is also based on 
the finding of selective impairments in psychological but not physical self awareness (Williams, 
2010). 
    
Thirdly, if the finding of typical social stereotyping (e.g. “Beauty is Good (BIG)” stereotype) 
found in ASD children is taken as representative (Fonseca et al, 2011), then no group 
differences are expected for spontaneously generated BIG, HIG and related stereotypes for the 
unknown other pictures. It is to be noted however that this prediction is somewhat 
counterintuitive in the context of impaired social cognition and SRC generally seen in ASD.  
 
Fourthly, there will be a significant relationship between performance on the TOM tasks 
(which are expected to be impaired in the ASD group, see section 2.3.2) and SRC tasks. More 
specifically, TOM performance will be significantly related to the magnitude of SREs and the 
generation of personal and social attributes that are expected to differ between groups. This is 
predicted on the basis of the “absent self hypothesis” and findings demonstrating a connection 
between SREs and the Mind in the eyes task (Baron-Cohen et al. 2007), and upon the 
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neuropsychological overlap found between SRC and social cognition, particularly in the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, including a neural SRE for NT individuals but not those with an 
ASD (Lombardo et al. 2010, see section 1.5.1.2). 
 
2.3.2 Social Cognition Measures used in Study 2 
 
As detailed in section 1.3, one of the primary social cognitive models used to explain the socio-
communicative impairments in ASD is the impaired “Theory of Mind” (TOM) model. The 
related TOM tasks come in degrees of difficulty, from first order (FOTOM), then second order 
(SOTOM) tasks to advanced “pragmatic tasks” involving “social perspective taking”, described 
in section 1.3.2. Given the High functioning adolescent participants taking part in the present 
research, a range of advanced TOM tasks were selected. These tasks cover a range of verbal, 
non-verbal, affective, cognitive and pragmatic elements. All the selected TOM tasks have 
shown deficits in HFA and ASD adolescents (with the exception of the experimental Yoni task 
which has not yet been tested in this population, see section 2.3.2.4). These TOM tasks are 
described in the following sections and examples of each can be found in Appendix 5.  
 
2.3.2.1 Adult Mind in the Eyes Task 
 
The Adult Mind in the eyes task (Baron-Cohen et al, 2001) comprises 36 separate pictures of 
eyes and requests participants to select one of four emotion-related words that they think 
best describes the emotion in the eyes. The task is not timed and participants are instructed 
that they can refer to a vocabulary sheet if they are uncertain of the meaning of an emotion-
word. Children and adolescents with ASD and HFA are impaired on this task (Baron-cohen, 
2001, Kaland et al, 2008). 
2.3.2.2 Character Intentions Task 
 
The Character Intentions task (Brunet et al, 2000) is a non-verbal theory of mind task. 
Participants are shown 28 picture stories, comprising three scenes each. Participants are asked 
to choose one of 3 additional pictures that best complete the story. In order to solve the task 
participants have to gage the intentions of the characters in the pictures. Children and 
adolescents with ASD and HFA are impaired on this task (e.g. Duverger et al, 2007). 
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2.3.2.3 Adult Faux Pas Task 
 
The adult Faux Pas Task (Stone et al, 1998) is an advanced theory of mind task involving social 
perspective taking. Twenty faux pas stories comprise this task, which are read out and placed 
in front of participants. 10 stories contain “social faux pas” and 10 stories do not. Both children 
(Baron-cohen, 1999) and Adults (Zalla et al, 2009) with HFA and Aspergers syndrome are 
impaired on this task, failing to understand the nature of the social faux pas and also over-
detecting faux pas in non-faux pas stories. 
 
2.3.2.4  Yoni Task 
 
This experimental computer based Yoni task (Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2007) was included to 
assess participants’ accuracy and response times in determining which of 4 objects a fictional 
character (Yoni) is referring to. The participant must deduce this based on a sentence and 
other cues in the picture such as eye gaze and emotional expression. The task is divided into 24 
first order TOM trials (Yoni is thinking of...) and 42 second order TOM trials (Yoni likes the 
object that _ _likes) with a mixture of cognitive (“thinking of”) and affective (likes/loves/does 
not love...”) sentences. In the second order tasks some trials have Yoni looking straight ahead 
in which case the answers must be deduced on other cues such as expression in these trials. 
The ‘straight ahead’ conditions inhibits participants from thinking they can deduce answers 
solely from eye gaze direction. The task also includes some physical conditions that act as 
control tasks: First order “Yoni is close to...”, and second order: “Yoni has the object that __ 
has”. This task has been included as a TOM task with a timed element to parallel the timing 
pressure present in the experimental fluency tasks. Existing studies show Second order Yoni 
speed deficits in “Traumatic Brain Injury” populations, and Parkinson’s disease (Bodden et al, 
2010), though no studies have yet used the task in ASD populations. 
 
2.3.3 Method 
 
2.3.3.1 Participants 
 
16 participants with a diagnosis of an Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD) were recruited for the 
experimental group. The ASD diagnosis for all participants had been confirmed through an 
Autism Diagnostic Observation Scale (ADOS; Lord, Rutter and Goode, 1989) assessment 
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conducted in previous research with the participants for a different phD (Wojcik, 2011). All 
reached ADOS cut-off scores for an ASD diagnosis, and 12 participants were clinically defined 
as having Aspergers and 4 as having High functioning Autism. The participants with an ASD all 
attended a mainstream school. Additionally, 18 age and IQ matched control participants were 
recruited. IQ scores were obtained for all participants using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence (WASI). The study and recruitment process were approved by the Leeds Research 
Ethics Committee (see Appendix 4). There were no significant differences in age between the 
ASD (M 15.2 years, SD 2.7) and Control (M 14.5, SD 1.4) groups, t(32)=1.03, p=.31. Similarly, no 
significant differences in IQ between the ASD (M 115.3, SD 13.8) and the control (M 116.3, SD 
10.7) groups were found, t(31)= -0.23, p=.82. In terms of gender, the ASD group composed of 
14 males and 2 females, and the control group composed of 10 males and 8 females. 
 
2.3.3.2 Procedure 
 
All participants were tested individually. WASI scores for the ASD participants had already 
been acquired in previous doctoral research. The WASI test was administered to the Control 
group after all the experimental testing had been completed. Experimental tests were 
administered in the following order: Animals, I Am task, (S)he is tasks, Eyes test, Yoni computer 
task (performed on a laptop), Character intentions task and Faux pas task. Instructions and 
examples for each task can be found in the Appendix 5. All data collection and coding into 
physical, social and personal attribution categories was undertaken by the author to ensure 
reliability and consistency. 
 
2.3.4 Results 
 
The first part of the results focuses on group differences across all the fluency tasks and 
attribution types (7 (task) x3 (type) x2 (group)) ANOVA. The main focus was to determine if 
SREs are different between groups and if attribution patterns are different between groups. 
Additionally, any effects will then be analysed for their relationship with general fluency 
(animals) ability using correlations and ANCOVA. The second part of the results section focuses 
on possible group differences in social stereotyping using Chi-Square analyses. The final 
section concentrates on social cognition including group differences on TOM tasks (and the 
impact of group variation on TOM tasks) and the effects discovered on the fluency tasks, using 
ANCOVA. 
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2.3.4.1 Repeated measures ANOVA 
 
For the initial analysis, a Mixed (within and between subjects) Analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
was conducted in order to detect possible differences in fluency in the 7 task conditions and 
the 3 types of attribution between the ASD and Control group (Task x Type x Group).   See 
Table 3.1 for a summary of the descriptive statistics from the data analysis.  
 
The results revealed a significant effect of Group, with overall impaired fluency in the ASD 
group compared to the control group, F(1,32) = 9.92, p<.01. Similar to Study 1, there was a 
significant main effect of Task F(6,192)= 18.51, p<.001, Type F(2,64)= 22.49, p<.001 and 
Task*Type interaction F(12,384)=21.29 p<.001. There was also a significant Type*Group 
interaction effect F(2,64)= 9.21, p<.001. The Task*Group interaction was not significant F(6, 
192)= 0.62, p=.72. The Task*Type*Group interaction was also not significant at the p<.05 level,  
F(12, 384)= 1.58, p=.095 
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Table 3.1. Summary of fluency scores for the ASD and control groups across task conditions 
and attribution types, means and (SDs). 
Task Condition  Attribution 
Type 
  
 physical social personal Total 
I Am task 
ASD 
Control 
 
2.13 (1.54) 
1.83 (0.84) 
 
2.63 (1.78) 
3.06 (1.77) 
 
2.00 (2.16) 
4.44 (2.04) 
 
6.75 (2.07) 
9.11 (2.14) 
Known Harry Potter 
ASD 
Control 
 
2.06 (1.53) 
2.28 (1.23) 
 
2.13 (2.67) 
2.17 (1.76) 
 
0.69 (1.20) 
2.44 (1.92) 
 
4.88 (1.67) 
6.89 (2.52) 
Known Queen 
ASD 
Control 
 
2.62 (1.86) 
2.06 (1.31) 
 
1.87 (1.67) 
3.11 (1.88) 
 
0.56 (0.63) 
1.67 (1.68) 
 
5.06 (1.98) 
6.83 (2.20) 
Unknown Unattractive 
ASD 
Control 
 
3.25 (2.27) 
2.56 (1.38) 
 
0.06 (0.25) 
0 (0) 
 
1.13 (1.5) 
3.50 (1.62) 
 
4.50 (2.34) 
6.11 (1.68) 
Unknown Attractive 
ASD 
Control 
 
2.94 (2.11) 
3.33 (1.53) 
 
0.50 (1.75) 
0.11 (0.32) 
 
0.75 (1.53) 
2.44 (1.69) 
 
3.69 (2.12) 
5.83 (2.20) 
Unknown Happy 
ASD 
Control 
 
3.88 (1.89) 
3.83 (1.51) 
 
0 (0) 
0.39 (0.78) 
 
0.69 (1.01) 
2.06 (1.47) 
 
4.56 (1.90) 
6.22 (1.77) 
Unknown Sad 
ASD 
Control 
 
 
3.88 (2.06) 
3.44 (1.85) 
 
0 (0) 
0.33 (0.69) 
 
0.69 (1.08) 
3.11 (1.75) 
 
4.13 (2.09) 
6.89 (2.10) 
Animal task 
ASD 
Control 
 
 
 
   
14.19 (3.31) 
17.56 (2.87) 
     
 
 
Upon initial inspection, Table 3.1 indicates the same main effects as those found in Study 1. 
Namely, in terms of the significant main effect of Task, both groups appear to have greater 
total fluency for the I Am task compared to the (s)he is tasks, demonstrating an SRE, though 
the overall fluency in the ASD group appears to be much lower. To better understand these 
effects, further specific contrasts will be made in connection with the main aims and 
hypotheses.  
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2.3.4.2 Self-Reference Effect 
 
A central expectation was that a reduced SRE in the ASD group would be found. The main 
effect of Task in the 7 (task)x3 (type) x2 (group) ANOVA revealed significant differences 
between the I Am task and (S)he is Tasks. The between subjects effect also highlighted 
significant group differences, with impaired total fluency in the ASD group. However, the 
Task*Group interaction was clearly non-significant suggesting that the main effect of Task was 
not different between groups.  
 
To pursue these effects further, a separate 3 (task) x2 (group) ANOVA was performed for total 
fluency across the I Am and known other tasks (Harry Potter and the Queen) and experimental 
groups. This was done primarily to be representative of other studies investigating SREs which 
usually only compare self to known other conditions (Toichi et al. 2002; Lombardo et al, 2007; 
Henderson et al, 2009). Separate ANOVAs were also performed for each group in order to 
obtain all the relevant contrasts, with bonferroni corrections to allay family-wise error. 
 
The 3 (task) x2 (group) ANOVA revealed a main effect of Task F(2,64)= 25.68, p<.001, and 
significant between group differences F(1,32)= 9.39, p<.01. The Task*Group interaction was 
again non-significant F(2,64)= 0.42, p=.66. The significant between group effect revealed 
impaired overall fluency in the ASD compared to the control group with large effect sizes: I Am 
(d =0.97), Harry Potter (d = 0.96) and Queen (d=0.84).     
 
The main effect of Task revealed a clear SRE that was not different between groups. In the ASD 
group, fluency in the I Am task (6.75) was significantly greater than in Harry (4.88, d=1.09, 
p<.01) and the Queen (5.06, d=0.88, p<.05). Harry and the Queen did not differ significantly 
from each other. Similarly in the control group, fluency in the I Am task (9.11) was significantly 
greater than in Harry (6.89, d=1.15, p<.001) and the Queen (6.83, d=1.02, p<.01), and Harry 
and the Queen did not differ from each other. The large effect sizes of these SREs were 
comparable between groups. Similarly, an SRE was also seen in an additional 3 (task) x2 
(group) ANOVA for personal attributions only, mirroring the findings in Study 1, main effect of 
Task, F(2,64)=22.17, p<.001.  This SRE in personal attributes did not significantly differ between 
groups, indicated by an insignificant Task*group interaction F(2,64)=2.02, p=.14. In short, the 
ASD group did show a typical SRE. 
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2.3.4.3 General Fluency abilities 
 
The ASD group (M=14.19, SD=3.31) showed significantly reduced fluency in an independent 
samples t-test compared to controls (M=17.56, SD=2.87) on the animals semantic category 
fluency task, t(32)=-3.18, p<.01, d=-1.09, with a very large effect size. In the ASD group, there 
were large significant correlations between animal category fluency and total fluency scores on 
the I Am task (r=.566, p<.05) and known others tasks, Harry (r=.632, p<.01) and Queen (r=.557, 
p<.05). In the control group, there was a trend toward significant correlations: I Am task 
(r=.391, p=.054), Harry (r=.334, p=.088), Queen (r=.276, p=.13). These medium correlations in 
the control group, though not significant at the p<.05 level, are comparable in size to those 
found in Study 1 (see section 2.2.3.5).  
 
The large significant correlations in the ASD group indicate a connection between reduced 
general fluency abilities on the animals task and the finding of reduced fluency on the I Am and 
known other tasks. Indeed, when animals is entered as a covariate the significant differences 
between groups in the 3 (task) x2 (group) ANOVA (reported in section 2.3.3.2) becomes non-
significant F(1,31)= 2.07, p=.16. Animals is a significant covariate F(1,31)= 10.96, p<.01. The 
task*group interaction remains non significant F(2,62)= 0.05, p=.95. As with Study 1, paired 
sample t-tests showed that animal fluency was significantly greater than fluency on the I Am 
task in both the ASD group, t(15)=10.43, p<.001, d=2.63 and the Control group t(17)=12.65, 
p<.001, d=2.92, with very large effect sizes.  
 
It should be noted however that category fluency in the high functioning ASD group (14.19) is 
not significantly different to category fluency found in the large pilot sample (14.24) in Study 1. 
It is possible that the above average IQ of the control group in the present study is one reason 
for their increased category fluency compared to the piloting study and ASD participants (given 
that the pilot sample of 99 NT adolescents were taken from a range of ability sets in an 
average school, it is not unreasonable to assume that the IQ of the group will be roughly 
average). This would imply that general IQ abilities differentially affect fluency in NT 
adolescents and those with an ASD. Indeed, correlations between IQ and category fluency give 
some indication of this, in that for the ASD group (r=.219, p=.43) the correlation was 
somewhat smaller than for the Control group (r=.389, p=.11). Moreover, in a univariate 
analysis, IQ was a significant covariate for group differences in animal category fluency, 
F(1,31)=4.33, p<.05, though the group difference nonetheless remained significant. A sample 
with a wider range of IQs would be needed to test this further.   
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2.3.4.4 Physical, Social and Personal Attributes 
 
The central expectation of the study was that the ASD group would generate fewer social and 
personal attributes. In line with findings in Study 1, the 7 (task) x3 (type) x2 (group) ANOVA 
(see section 2.3.3.1) revealed a significant effect of Type and a Type*Task interaction. It also 
revealed the significant Type*Group interaction indicating differences between groups.  
 
To better understand these effects, 3 separate ANOVAs were calculated for physical, social and 
personal attributions, in order to parallel the analysis done in Study 1, with the addition of the 
between subjects Group factor. Given the clear patterns delineated in Study 1, only the 
planned contrasts of interest were made, with the required Bonferroni corrections.  
 
2.3.4.4.1 Physical Attributions 
 
The mixed 7 (task) x 2 (group) ANOVA for physical attributions revealed no significant 
differences between the ASD and control group, F(1,32)= 0.23, p=.63. As in Study 1, there was 
a significant effect of Task, F(6,192) = 11.99, p<.001. The Task*group interaction was non-
significant.  
 
Inspection of Figure 3.1 clearly shows a similar overall pattern across tasks delineated in Study 
1 (e.g. see figure 2.2), and very little difference between groups. The pattern of increased 
production of physical attributions toward unknown others compared to known others or 
oneself is clearly evident. Contrasts revealed significantly greater fluency in the following 
pattern: Happy and Sad > Attractive and Unnattractive > Harry, the Queen and I Am, all p<.05, 
with the sole exception of a non-significant contrast between the Queen and unattractive 
pictures. As expected, there were no differences in the number of physical attributions 
generated between groups. 
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Figure: 3.1 A figure to show the mean number of physical attributions made by each group 
on each of the fluency tasks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Error bars represent 
standard error 
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2.3.4.4.2 Social Attributions 
 
The mixed 7 (task) x 2 (group) ANOVA for social attributions revealed no significant differences 
between the ASD and control group, F(1,32)= 1.61, p=.21. As in Study 1, there was a significant 
effect of Task, F(6,192) = 38.22, p<.001. The Task*group interaction was not significant 
F(6,192) = 1.58, p=.154 
 
Figure 3.2 shows a largely similar pattern of results to those found in Study 1. Contrasts 
revealed significantly increased production of social attributions in the I Am task and Known 
other tasks compared to the Unknown other tasks (all p<.001), with non-significant differences 
between groups. The I Am task and the known other tasks were not significantly different from 
each other. As with Study 1, no SRE was found for social attributions compared to known 
others. 
 
One difference that stands out between Study 2 and Study 1 is increased production of social 
attributions in the I Am task in the current Study. Indeed this difference between the Study 2 
(combined mean= 2.84) compared to Study 1 (m=1.52) for the I Am task is significant in an 
independent samples t-test, t(52)=-3.86, p<.001. This difference does not appear to be related 
to the ‘above average’ IQ of the experimental groups compared to Study 1, as IQ does not 
correlate significantly with fluency for social I Am attributions, r= -.14, p=.45. However further 
study would need to investigate this further including participants with IQ’s over a wider 
range.  The difference may also be related to additional factors such as differences in the 
testing conditions in Study 1 (e.g. tested in a social setting with members of a group around) 
and Study 2 (tested individually). Overall, the hypothesis that there would be group differences 
in the generation of social attributes has not been corroborated; no significant group 
differences were found. 
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Figure: 3.2 A figure to show the mean number of social attributions made by each group on 
each of the fluency tasks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Error bars represent 
standard error 
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2.3.4.4.3 Personal Attributions 
 
The mixed 7 (task) x 2 (group) ANOVA for personal attributes revealed significant differences 
between the ASD and control group, F(1,32)= 86.56, p=.001. As in Study 1, there was a 
significant effect of Task, F(6,192) = 12.79, p<.001. The Task*group interaction was not 
significant F(6,192) = 1.88, p=.086 
 
Figure 3.3 shows a large reduction in the number of personal attributes made by the ASD 
group compared to the Control group, across all tasks. These group differences all have very 
large effect sizes: I Am task (d=1.16), and (s)he is tasks (ranging from d=0.96 to d=1.71). In line 
with the hypothesis, we have found reduced generation of personal attributes in the ASD 
group across all tasks. The group difference remains significant when controlling for general 
fluency abilities by entering category fluency (animals) as a covariate F(1,31)= 11.70, p<.01. 
Category fluency is not a significant covariate F(1,31)= 2.31, p=.14. The task*group interaction 
remains just outside the p<.05 significance level F(6,186)= 2.06, p=.06. Individual contrasts 
reveal an SRE, like Study 1, with significantly more personal attributions in the I Am task 
compared to all other tasks, with the sole exception of the Unattractive picture. 
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Figure: 3.3 A figure to show the mean number of personal attributions made by each group 
on each of the fluency tasks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Error bars represent 
standard error 
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2.3.4.4.4 Group differences on the I Am task 
 
A separate 3 (type) x 2 (group) ANOVA was performed on the I Am task, revealing a significant 
group difference F(1,32) = 348.84, p<.001, a significant effect of Type F(2,64)=3.85, p<.05, and 
a significant Group*Type interaction F(2,64)=4.77, p<.05. Separate individual contrasts (with 
Bonferroni corrections to allay family wise error) revealed that the NT group produced 
significantly more personal attributions (4.44) than physical attributions (1.83, p<.001 d=1.8) 
and a trend of the same in respect of social attributions (3.06, p=.11, d=.55). In contrast, the 
ASD group showed no significant differences between attribution type: personal (2.00), social 
(2.63) or physical (2.13).  
 
2.3.4.5 Social Stereotypes 
 
The inclusion of the four unknown faces, Happy and Sad, and Attractive and Unattractive, 
enabled an assessment of whether there are any group differences between spontaneous 
judgements made about them. Statements made by each individual participant were 
qualitatively assessed and coded. For Happy and Sad, if a participant had made a statement 
relevant to mood about the Happy and Sad pictures, this was determined as either positively 
or negatively valenced (e.g. Happy, feeling good versus sad, feeling bad, miserable). If a 
participant had not made a statement relevant to mood then that participant was coded as 
“neutral”. Each participant is coded as judging each picture as either “Happy” or “Sad” or 
“neutral”. Similarly for the Attractive and unattractive pictures: each participant is coded as 
judging the picture as either “attractive” (e.g. beautiful, pretty, gorgeous) or “unattractive” 
(e.g. ugly, unpretty) or “neutral”. Additionally, for each picture, the participants were coded as 
judging the person in the picture as either “good” (e.g. friendly, nice, trustworthy) or “bad” 
(e.g. unfriendly, horrible person, scary, criminal) or “neutral”. No participant referred to the 
same picture as both “good and bad”, “happy and sad” or “attractive and unattractive”. This 
justified the use of a classification scheme at the participant level. 
 
2.3.4.5.1 Judging Happiness and Attractiveness 
 
Only one participant made an unexpected judgement, judging the Attractive Picture as ugly. 
This participant makes the 5.6% in the table 3.2. This made it possible to understand the 
findings largely in terms of percentages of participants making the expected judgements 
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versus not making any judgements, though the Chi-square is still calculated between groups 
across all judgement types. 
 
Chi-Square tests revealed that significantly fewer ASD participants (50%) made spontaneous 
“Happy” judgements about the Happy picture than in the control group (83.3%), χ2 (1)= 4.3, 
p<.05. Similarly, significantly fewer “sad” judgements were made for the sad picture in the ASD 
(18.8%) than control group (61.1%), χ2 (1)= 6.28, p<.05. 
 
There was a trend toward fewer ASD participants (6.2%) making spontaneous “Attractive” 
Judgements for the Attractive picture compared to the controls (33.3%), though this was not 
significant at the p<.05 level, χ2(2)= 5.09, p=.079. A similar trend was found for “Unattractive” 
judgements about the Unattractive picture between ASD (12.5%) and controls (38.9%), though 
not significant at the P<.05 level, χ2(1)= 3.03, p=.082.  
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Table 3.2 to show percentage of participants making various judgement types about each 
unknown picture. 
 
Picture  Judgement Type   
 “Happy” “Sad” Neutral 
Happy* 
ASD 
Control 
 
 
50%  
83.3%  
 
0%  
0%  
 
50% 
16.7%  
Sad* 
ASD 
Control 
 
0% 
0% 
  
 
18.8% 
61.1%  
 
81.3% 
38.9%  
 
 
Attractive  
ASD 
Control 
“Attractive” 
 
 
6.2% 
33.3%  
“Unattractive” 
 
 
0% 
5.6%  
Neutral 
 
 
93.8% 
61.1%  
 
Unattractive  
ASD 
Control 
 
 
0% 
0% 
 
 
12.5% 
38.9% 
 
 
87.5% 
61.1% 
    
Significant group differences (χ2) across judgements are indicated next to the picture type by an * 
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2.3.4.5.2 Judging Goodness and Badness 
 
Only one control participant made an unexpected judgement, judging the happy picture as 
bad, making it possible to understand the findings in terms of percentages making the 
expected judgement versus not making a judgement. Chi-Square tests revealed that 
significantly fewer ASD participants made spontaneous “Good” judgments about the Happy 
picture (6.2%) compared to controls (50%), χ2(2)= 9.45, p<.01. The same finding holds for the 
Attractive picture, ASD (6.2%) compared to controls (44.4%), χ2(1)= 6.35, p<.05. ASD 
participants were also significantly less likely to make “Bad” judgements about the Sad picture 
(6.2%) compared to Controls (72.2%), χ2(1)= 15.22, p<.001. There was a trend toward fewer 
ASD participants making “bad” judgments about the unattractive picture (31.2%) compared to 
controls (61.1%), though this was not significant at the p<.05 level, χ2(1)= 3.03, p=.08. 
 
Judgments of attractiveness and happiness for each picture correlated significantly with the 
corresponding judgement of goodness and badness (using Spearman’s rho non-parametric 
tests): Happy picture (r=.35, p<.05), Sad picture (r=.64, p<.001), Attractive picture (r=.44. 
p<.01), Unattractive picture (r=.37, p<.05). Other significant correlations were less common 
and more mixed, see Appendix 3 for a table of all the relevant correlations. 
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Table 3.3 to show percentage of participants making good, bad or no/neutral character 
judgements about each picture  
 
Picture  Judgement Type   
 “Good” “Bad” Neutral 
Happy* 
ASD 
Control 
 
 
6.2%  
50%  
 
0%  
5.6%  
 
93.8% 
44.4%  
Sad* 
ASD 
Control 
 
0% 
0% 
  
 
6.2% 
72.2%  
 
93.8% 
27.8%  
 
Attractive* 
ASD 
Control 
 
 
6.2% 
44.4%  
 
 
0% 
0% 
 
 
93.8% 
55.6%  
 
Unattractive  
ASD 
Control 
 
 
0% 
0% 
 
 
31.2% 
61.1% 
 
 
68.8% 
38.9% 
    
Significant group differences (χ2) across judgements are indicated next to the picture type by an * 
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2.3.4.6 Social Cognition 
 
This section of the results focuses on group differences in the TOM tasks, and their relationship 
to the SRC fluency effects. The descriptive statistics are summarised in Table 3.4 on the next 
page. 
 
2.3.4.6.1 Oneway ANOVAS 
 
There were no significant group differences on the Mind in the Eyes task, F(1)=1.30, p=.26, 
Character intentions task, F(1)=2.36, p=.135, Faux pas stories, F(1)=1.85, p=.183 and Non-faux 
pas stories F(1)=2.94, p=.096. There were also no differences on the comprehension control 
questions to the faux pas stories F(1)=2.42, P=.130.  
 
Significant group differences were found on the Yoni Task in terms of time taken to complete 
First order trials F(1)= 10.35, p<.01 d=1.32, and Second order trials F(1)= 28.78, p<.001, d=2.07, 
with extremely large effect sizes. No significant group differences were found in the physical 
Yoni control trials for either first order, F(1)=3.32, p=.078 or Second order, F(1)=2.97, p=.096. 
Accuracy scores for all Yoni conditions did not differ significantly between groups. 
 
The failure to find significant differences between groups on several of the TOM tasks was 
unusual. As described in section 2.1.4, deficits in ASDs were expected on all these tasks. The 
present lack of deficits may in part be due to practice effects; the participants in the ASD group 
have done children’s versions of the eyes and faux pas tasks on several occasions before in 
previous doctoral research. Indeed, they did show speed deficits on the Yoni TOM (but not 
Yoni physical control tasks) which they have not seen before. These issues are explored further 
in the discussion.  
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Table 3.4 Shows the Mean scores and Standard deviations for each TOM task by Group 
 
Task Condition Mean Scores 
(SD) 
  
  
ASD 
 
Control 
 
Mind in the Eyes 
 
 
21.88 (4.86) 
 
 
23.44 (3.05) 
Character Intentions 
 
23.50 (5.57) 25.67 (2.09) 
Faux Pas Stories 
 
53.69 (12.75) 57.94 (3.54) 
Non Faux Pas Stories 
 
18.00 (2.07) 19.11 (1.71) 
Yoni First Order** 
 
48.24 (20.66) 31.72 (4.52) 
Yoni Physical first order 
 
24.26 (11.7) 18.65 (4.62) 
Yoni Second Order** 
 
278.26 (44.73) 191.17 (39.61) 
Yoni Physical second order 
 
  31.57 (11.22) 24.91 (8.77) 
   
** On a task indicates significant group differences at the p<.01 level. Significant correlations 
are * for the p<.05 and ** for p<.01. The Yoni task scores refer to time taken and not accuracy 
scores. 
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2.3.4.7 Social cognition and SRC 
 
In order to determine if a relationship can be found between social cognition and group 
differences in self-referential cognition, several ANCOVAs were performed with the social 
cognition measures as covariates. Firstly, a 3x2 ANCOVA (Task x Group) was performed to 
determine if the main group difference of impaired fluency was related to differences in social 
cognition. The 3 tasks were I Am, Harry and the Queen, paralleling the 3x2 ANOVA in section 
2.3.3.2. With Social cognition measures as covariates, the group differences became non-
significant F(1,18)=3.52, p=.075, suggesting a relationship, albeit weak, between social 
cognition abilities and fluency on self and other concept tasks. However, none of the TOM 
measures taken individually were significant covariates: Character intentions  F(1,18)=2.27, 
p=.15, Mind in the eyes F(1,18)=1.31, p=.27, Faux pas stories F(1,18)=0.495, p=.491, Non-faux 
pas stories F(1,18)=0.33, p=.573, Yoni First Order F(1,18)=1.75, p=.20 and Yoni Second Order 
F(1,18)=0.25, p=.62.  
 
Additionally, a 7 (task) x2 (Group) ANCOVA was performed to determine whether the main 
group difference of less personal attributions generated in the ASD group was related to social 
cognition. With social cognition measures as covariates, the group differences became non-
significant F(1,18)=4.35, p=.051, though caution is warranted in interpreting the result due to 
its being so close to significance at the p<.05 level. None of the social cognition measures 
individually were significant covariates. This implies only a weak relationship between social 
cognition and the generation of personal attributes.  
 
However there were some interesting findings in relation to the SRE effect (main effect of 
Task) seen in the 3x2 ANOVA (see section 2.3.3.2). The SRE becomes clearly non-significant 
with social cognition measures as covariates in the 3x2 ANCOVA, F(2,36)=0.687, p=.51. To 
explore this further, the SRE was quantified in terms of mean differences between the I Am 
and Harry task, and the I Am and Queen Task. Bivariate correlations revealed a relationship 
with the eyes task, with a significant a correlation with SRE magnitude for “I Am – Harry”, 
r=.35, p<.05, and a comparable though non-significant correlation for “I Am-Queen”, r=.23, 
p=.19. This lends support to Lombardo et al.’s (2007) finding of a similar connection between 
SRE effects and the eyes task in memory paradigms. Additionally, correlations revealed a 
relationship with the Second Order Timed Yoni task, with a significant correlation for “I Am – 
Queen”, r-.47, p=.014, and a comparable though non-significant correlation for “I Am- Harry”, 
r-.3, p=.13. The direction of the correlations imply that superior performance on the eyes task 
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and faster performance on the Yoni task (less time) are connected with larger SREs. All other 
correlations with TOM tasks were smaller and non-significant. 
 
The Task*Group interaction also remained non-significant showing no relationship between 
group differences in social cognition and the magnitude of SRE effects, F(2,36)=0.57, p=.57. 
The group differences in category fluency (animals) also became marginally non-significant 
when social cognition measures were added as covariates, F(1,18)=4.27, p=.053. Only the Yoni 
First Order Task was a significant covariate, F(1,18)=4.68, p=.044. This showed a connection 
between TOM and Fluency based Executive Functions. 
 
Together, these results indicate weak relationships between measures of social cognition and 
impaired fluency on general category fluency (animals), self and known others tasks. However, 
the magnitude of SREs is significantly correlated with the eyes task and speed on the Second 
Order Yoni task. 
 
2.3.5 Summary and Discussion 
 
2.3.5.1 The SRE 
 
Despite findings for a reduced or absent SRE in ASDs using memory paradigms (e.g. Lombardo 
et al, 2007; Henderson et al, 2009), the present Study did not find the predicted reduced SRE in 
fluency for self vs other concepts. Indeed, an SRE was present equally in the ASD group and 
control group with comparable large effect sizes between the I Am task and Known others 
(Harry and the Queen), with no significant task*group interactions. Like with Study 1, the SRE 
effect was found to depend mainly on personal attributes. It is concluded that in this study, 
individuals with ASD showed the same relative superiority in fluency tasks relating to the self 
compared to tasks relating to known others.  The implications of this will be taken up in the 
general discussion. 
 2.3.5.2 Social and Personal Attributions 
 
It was predicted that significantly fewer social and personal attributions across all fluency tasks 
would be seen in the ASD group compared to the control group, based on research findings 
using the SUI and psychological self awareness (Jackson et al. 2012; Williams, 2010). Study 2 
indeed demonstrated significantly fewer personal attributions in the ASD group across all 
fluency tasks, with very large effect sizes. These group differences remained significant when 
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controlling for category fluency (animals). However, no significant group differences were 
found in fluency for social attributions across all fluency tasks. The prediction was therefore 
partly supported, with a clear finding of impaired generation of personal attributes in the ASD 
group, independent of general fluency abilities. Moreover, considering only the I Am task, the 
NT group showed a significant preference for more personal attributions than social and 
physical ones, with medium to large effects sizes, whereas the ASD group showed no 
differences across the three types on this task. The implications of these findings will be 
explored in the general discussion following this section. 
2.3.5.3 General Category fluency 
 
The ASD group showed significantly impaired category fluency (animals) compared to the age 
and IQ matched controls, with a very large effect size. Moreover, the ASD group showed 
similar impaired fluency across all fluency tasks, with large effect sizes. Indeed, category 
fluency (animals) correlated significantly with the I Am and (s)he is fluency scores. 
Furthermore, Category fluency (animals) was a significant covariate, and group differences in 
total fluency across all fluency tasks became non-significant when category fluency was 
entered into an ANCOVA. Category fluency in the ASD group was however comparable to that 
found in pilot Study 1. There was some indication that increased IQ abilities differentially 
impacted category fluency for controls compared to ASDs in Study 2. Overall, though the 
weight of evidence in the literature would suggest no marked category fluency impairments in 
HFA adolescents (see section 2.1.3), the picture is somewhat mixed. The present study adds to 
these mixed findings. 
 
2.3.5.4 Intellectual abilities 
 
One limitation of the study is that the individual breakdown for verbal and performance IQ 
scores are not available for analysis at the participant level. However, the average scores for 
the ASD group are available, and show no differences between verbal IQ (m=115), 
performance IQ (m=111) and full scale (m=115) intelligence quotients. Indeed, though 
language and communication difficulties characterise aspects of the ASD phenotype and whilst 
ASD samples taken as a whole tend to show lower verbal IQs compared to non-verbal IQs (e.g. 
Thomson et al, 2011; Charman et al, 2011), the profile for AS and HFA in the literature is 
somewhat different.  
 
One study looking at children with an ASD without intellectual disability found that verbal 
comprehension and IQ were within the normal range for AS but in the lower boundary of the 
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normal range for PDD-NOS and Autistic disorder (Kjellmer et al, 2012) and another study 
involving chinese young adults with an ASD but normal intelligence found no discrepancy 
between verbal and performance IQ (Poon Mak, 2012). Furthermore, significantly higher 
verbal IQ in Asperger groups is a common finding compared to other ASD subtypes (Foley-
nicpon et al, 2012; Saulnier & Klin, 2007; Ghaziuddin et al, 2004). 12 of the 16 participants in 
the present thesis ASD group had a diagnosis of AS, and their near identical Verbal and 
fullscale IQs were therefore in line with the general literature, suggesting that the present 
thesis analyses with the fullscale IQ can be taken as indicative of general verbal and 
performance abilities.  
 
Finally, though the present thesis ASD group performed significantly less well on the category 
fluency task compared to the control group (as discussed in section 2.3.5.3), it was shown that 
this in part may be due to the differential impact of IQ on each group (see section 2.3.4.3). 
Though it is unfortunate that the impact of verbal IQ cannot be assessed in connection with 
the verbal fluency task directly, it has already been noted that at least the average verbal and 
fullscale IQs for each group were equivalent, and at least one study has shown that for an ASD 
and control group matched on verbal abilities, the ASD group still showed deficits on the 
verbal fluency tasks (Spek et al, 2009), indicating differences between general verbal abilities 
and specific verbal fluency performance in ASD groups. 
 
2.3.5.5 Executive Functions 
 
It was noted in section 1.2.3.1 that people with an ASD often exhibit deficits on EF tasks 
relating to planning, cognitive flexibility and sometimes fluency (Hill, 2004). The present 
findings add to the mixed picture in regard to fluency, as discussed in section 2.3.4.3 and 
2.3.5.3. Additionally, on the Yoni 1st and 2nd order physical control tasks, the ASD group were 
not significantly slower at responding than the control group, indicating that the groups were 
comparable for processing speed and flexibility on this task. In short, except for the significant 
differences in category fluency between the ASD group and the experimental control group, 
differences in executive function were not significant in comparison to the pilot study group 
for category fluency or between experimental groups in terms of either processing speed or 
accuracy on the Yoni control tasks. 
2.3.5.6 Social Stereotypes 
 
On the basis of Fonseca et al.’s (2011) findings of typical BIG stereotypes in ASD, it was 
predicted that no group differences would be found in spontaneously generated social 
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stereotypes in the present study. However, a clear and significantly reduced number of 
participants in the ASD group made spontaneous judgements relating to mood (Happy and 
Sad). There was also a trend approaching significance for reduced number of ASD participants 
making judgements relating to Attractiveness and Unattractiveness. Regarding stereotyping, 
BIG and HIG effects were significantly less likely to be made by the ASD group than controls. 
Similarly ‘Sad is Bad’ (SID) stereotyping was significantly reduced in the ASD group, and there 
was a trend toward reduced ‘Ugly is Bad’ (UIB) stereotyping. Additionally, making judgments of 
happiness and attractiveness correlated significantly with making good/bad judgements for 
each corresponding picture, supporting the idea that the underlying stereotypes were the 
basis for the good/bad judgements.  
 
These results are more in line with what would be expected based on the social and SRC 
deficits seen in ASD. Moreover, the findings suggest that social stereotyping can successfully 
be tapped by open ended fluency measures and that important differences in ASD groups 
were found. It is possible that the group differences in the present study relate to the 
spontaneous nature of the social stereotyping on these fluency tasks, an aspect that was 
absent in the Fonseca et al. (2011) study. This possibility is explored further in the general 
discussion.  
2.3.5.7 Social cognition and SRC 
 
Impaired performance in the ASD group on all TOM tasks was expected (see section 2.1.4). 
However, the present study only found significant differences in a timed task involving utilising 
eye gaze and facial expression cues on cartoon faces. The ASD group took significantly longer 
to complete the tasks. These significant differences related to time taken and not overall 
accuracy and were present for both First and Second order TOM trials.  The groups did not 
differ significantly on either the first or second order physical control trials, suggesting that the 
significant differences on Yoni TOM trials related to deficits in the ASD group in processing 
social cues, not speed of processing generally. The lack of other significant differences on the 
eyes, faux pas and character intentions tasks maybe be due to the ASD group having done 
these or similar tests before in previous doctoral research.  
 
This finding suggests that Yoni is a good speeded task to assess the processing of social cues 
and which is sensitive to specific social deficits in a high functioning ASD adolescent population 
(it is the first time it has been used with ASDs). Given that the deficit related to the speed of 
social processing, it is perhaps a more ecologically valid measure than other TOM tasks, as it 
better parallels the speed at which social interactions occur in everyday naturalistic 
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encounters. It may therefore be capable of assessing more subtle TOM deficits relating to the 
speed of social processing rather than ability.  
 
On the basis of the “absent self hypothesis” (e.g. Frith 2003), the neural SRE for NT but not 
ASD groups (Lombardo et al. 2010), and the relationship found between group differences in 
the SRE in memory research and the Mind in the eyes test (Baron-Cohen et al, 2007), it was 
predicted that differences between groups in SRC on the fluency tasks would be related to 
measures of social cognition (TOM tasks). The two clear and significant group differences in 
SRC were impaired total fluency and impaired generation of personal attributes across all tasks 
in the ASD group. When the TOM measures were entered as covariates into the initial 3x2 and 
7x2 ANOVAS, the group differences were a little reduced and became marginally non-
significant at the p<.05 level. However, none of the TOM tasks taken individually were 
significant covariates.  
 
One clear finding however was that the SRE effect disappeared when the TOM tasks were 
entered as covariates in the ANCOVAs. Correlations revealed that superior performance on the 
eyes task and faster performance on the Yoni task (less time) was significantly connected with 
larger SREs. This paralleled the finding of Baron-Cohen et al. (2007) in memory paradigms, 
where the magnitude of SREs was related to the eyes task and to the endorsement of autistic 
traits on the AQ (see section 1.5.2). These issues are explored further in the general discussion. 
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3.0 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
“O would some power the giftie gie us to see ourselves as others see us”  
-Robert Burns (1759-1796) 
 
3.1 Overview 
 
This thesis has adopted a new approach for examining the differences in self referential 
cognition (SRC) between NT individuals and those with ASD utilising novel fluency tasks that 
involve the open-ended generation of self and other concepts (based on Kuhn and McPartland, 
1954). The I Am and (S)he is fluency tasks represent a new paradigm in the field of SRC. They 
uniquely allow the quantitative assessment of cognitive access to self and other concepts, as 
well as qualitative assessment of the types of self and other concepts generated, whilst 
preserving the open-ended, multi-faceted and subjective nature of the self-construct. The 
(s)he is tasks also enable the assessment of social stereotypes that are found to be 
spontaneously generated. 
 
Through use of these tasks the studies of this thesis have thereby investigated: the relative 
accessibility of self and other concepts; differences in the types of concepts generated across 
self, known and unknown others; the relationship between TOM measures and these areas; 
spontaneously generated social stereotypes; and differences between NT adolescents and 
those with ASD across all the foregoing. The paradigmatic SRE has been demonstrated using 
the novel fluency measures, and this SRE has been shown to be related to the generation of 
personal attributes rather than social or physical ones. Moreover, though the ASD group 
showed a SRE similar to the NT group, the magnitude of the SRE was significantly related to 
performance on the Eyes and Yoni second order TOM tasks, demonstrating a connection 
between this important self-referential effect and social cognition. These findings will be 
explored first in the discussion. 
 
Another key finding was that adolescents with ASD demonstrate a selective impairment in 
generating personal attributes across all fluency measures, even when controlling for category 
fluency ability. This suggests a specific psychological deficit in ASD for generating self and other 
concepts that are more subjective and personal in nature, whilst generating social roles and 
activities and physical attributes that are more concrete and objective in nature are preserved. 
This explanation parallels the psychological vs physical self-awareness distinction (Gillihan and 
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Farar, 2005) and is explored second in the discussion. It was also found that significantly more 
NT adolescents spontaneously made BIG, HIG and related stereotypes than ASD adolescents. 
This finding and its implications for the difficulties in social interactions seen in ASD are 
explored third in the discussion. In each of these sections limitations of the present study and 
areas for future research will be highlighted. Lastly, the clinical implications of the present 
findings are discussed. 
 
3.2 The Self Reference Effect (SRE) 
 
The classic SRE demonstrates that memories encoded in relation to the self are better 
remembered (see Section 1.4.4.2). Research in memory paradigms has found reduced or 
absent SREs in participants with ASDs (Lombardo et al, 2007; Henderson et al, 2009), 
supporting the “absent self hypothesis” (e.g. Frith et al, 2003). For NT individuals, recall is 
thought to be enhanced through the “fixed referent” of a well developed self-construct that 
supports the organisation and elaboration of knowledge (Symons and Johnson, 1997).  In ASD 
however, it appears that a diminished self construct leads to a reduced or absent SRE. Whilst 
these studies assessed the SRE in connection with self versus other memory recall, the present 
thesis explored the effect at the level of direct cognitive access and generation of self-concepts 
through the I Am and (s)he is tasks.  
 
It is clear that any self-concept that might be generated on these tasks depend upon the 
memory of autobiographical episodic and semantic information (EAM and SAK) to some 
extent. Indeed, the close relationship between memory and ‘I am’ statements has been 
demonstrated in previous research (Rathbone et al, 2008; 2009; 2011). However, rather than 
exploring the ability to recall incidental memories encoded in relation to either the self or 
others (as in the classic SRE memory paradigm), “the self” in these tasks was construed as a 
loosely defined open-ended construct, and the ability to access this self-relevant information 
and the type of information selected were the variables of interest, as opposed to the impact 
of “the self” on memory.   
 
The studies of the present thesis clearly demonstrated SREs at the level of cognitive access and 
generation of self versus other concepts in both NT adolescents and those with ASD. The effect 
sizes were very large, robustly indicating that concepts connected with the self were more 
readily generated than concepts connected with known others (Harry Potter and the Queen) 
and unknown others. This parallels the SREs for NT individuals found in memory recall research 
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between the self and Harry Potter (Lombardo et al, 2007, Henderson et al, 2009) and the 
neural SRE with the British Queen (Lombardo et al, 2010). Moreover, the present thesis found 
that the SREs were connected with the generation of personal attributes in both the NT and 
ASD group. That is, both groups were more able to generate ability-related emotions and 
thoughts, and traits of a more subjective nature (e.g. I am Friendly, I am depressed, he is 
creepy, she is talented) for the self rather than known and unknown others.  
 
It is to be remembered that in the instructions to the (s)he is tasks, participants were expressly 
encouraged to say what they think the person in the picture is like and that no answers were 
considered right or wrong. Consequently the dearth of personal attributions in the (s)he is 
tasks compared to the self can be considered as reflecting genuine differences in the 
generation of self and other concepts. However, the present study did not include a “Best 
friend” condition, as for example Lombardo et al. (2007) had done. It might be expected that 
there would be greater elaboration of personal information connected with a known friend as 
opposed to known media figures like Harry Potter or the Queen. Lombardo et al. (2007) did 
find a SRE in the ‘Self-Best friend’ comparison, however this SRE was not different between 
groups. Further research could explore whether there is a similar SRE for the I Am task in 
comparison with a “known friend” condition also, and whether differences exist between NT 
individuals and those with ASD 
 
Another factor that may have impacted the present study is that the I Am task did not involve 
picture cues whereas the (s)he is tasks do. The inclusion of a “best friend” condition (e.g. make 
as many (s)he is statements about your best friend in one minute) would also enable 
comparison of the I Am task with a task that didn’t use picture cues. Alternatively, the I Am 
task could be done with a picture of oneself presented to see if this had any impact on fluency 
or the types of statements generated. 
 
3.2.1 The SRE in ASD 
 
Adolescents with ASD did not show the reduced or absent SRE that was predicted. They 
showed a comparable SRE to the NT group, and which was connected with greater generation 
of personal attributes for the self versus other conditions. However, the ASD group did show 
impaired overall fluency across all self and other tasks, and it was found that this impairment 
related largely to the diminished generation of personal attributes, remaining significant even 
when controlling for general category fluency. These findings are explored in detail in section 
91 
 
3.3. They suggest however that whilst the ASD group showed a large SRE for personal 
attributes, there was nonetheless some pervasive difficulty in generating personal attributes 
per se.   
 
One possibility is that the SRE reflects the preservation of unique cognition relating to the self 
in ASD. As noted in section 1.5.2, the “absent self hypothesis” is not meant to suggest the 
absence of any self, only the diminishment of certain kinds of self-awareness (Lombardo et al. 
2010). The present fluency tasks may simply not be sensitive enough to capture diminished 
SREs in ASD. Another possibility is that compensatory mechanisms were at work in the self 
conditions (e.g. Happe, 1995). Statements such as “I am Kind, I am talented, I am moody” 
could be learnt as discrete pieces of semantic knowledge (SAK), important for social 
interactions and commonly called upon. In contrast, it is less often that one is required to 
make such personal statements about others. Consequently, without genuine psychological 
self awareness and intact simulation mechanisms (explored further in Section 3.3.2) it would 
be harder to compensate for a dearth of personal information about others than oneself.  
 
Such compensatory mechanisms would be enough to preserve an SRE in the ASD group, but 
are not an adequate replacement for genuine psychological self awareness, indexed by the 
overall superior generation of personal attributes for NT adolescents, even in the self 
condition. This seems a tenable alternative explanation for the preserved SRE in ASD, given the 
clear finding of significantly reduced fluency for personal attributions overall, including for “the 
self”. These issues are taken up in more detail in connection with the generation of personal 
attributes in Section 3.3, and important methodological limitations of the present Study are 
discussed in section 3.3.3. Alternatively, the preserved SRE in the ASD group might also be 
related to social cognition, a possibility explored in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 next.   
 
3.2.2 SRE and social cognition 
 
Regarding a connection between SRC and social cognition, it was found that the magnitude of 
the SRE (indexed in terms of mean differences between the self and both known other 
conditions) significantly correlated with the Mind in the Eyes task and speed on the Second 
Order Yoni task. Larger SREs were connected with superior ability on the eyes and faster time 
on the Yoni task. This indicated a connection between ascribing personal attributes to oneself 
(as against others) and TOM abilities. The findings closely mirror those of Lombardo et al. 
(2007) who also found a similar connection between SREs and the eyes task in memory 
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research and strengthen the hypothesis that TOM and SRC are inextricably linked (Uddin et al, 
2010; Lombardo et al, 2010).  
 
It is also noteworthy that the second order Yoni task correlated with the SREs, as this task was 
purposefully included to mirror the timed element in the fluency tasks. Additionally, the ASD 
group were significantly slower at completing this task compared to the NT group, but were 
not significantly different to the NT group in the time taken to complete physical Yoni control 
trials. It suggests that the ability to generate personal attributes about oneself was connected 
to the speed at which one can process socially relevant information, further strengthening the 
link between TOM and SRC. As noted in section 2.3.4, the Yoni task has proved a useful timed 
measure and is perhaps a more ecologically valid task than other TOM tasks. 
 
One limitation of the present study was the lack of clear deficits in the ASD group on several 
TOM tasks, perhaps partly due to practise effects (the ASD participants had all done a 
children’s versions of the faux pas test and eyes test in previous research whereas the NT 
group had not). It is also possible that the present ASD group had unusually preserved social 
cognition, and that this might explain the preserved SRE effect, given the connections between 
the SRE magnitude and performance on the eyes task demonstrated in the present study and 
in Lombardo et al.’s (2007) study. These possibilities are explored next.  
 
3.2.3 Comparing the ASD group to previous samples 
 
This section compares the present thesis ASD group to similar ASD samples used in other 
studies across the social cognition TOM tasks, in order to give an indication of their relative 
strengths in this regard. Additional comparisons with the samples used in Lombardo et al.’s 
(2007) study are made in Section 3.2.3.2, and provide an indication that the preserved social 
cognition in the present thesis sample may underlie their preserved SRE.   
 
3.2.3.1 Comparing the ASD group on TOM tasks 
 
A comparison of scores obtained in the present thesis to those obtained in other published 
studies with similar high functioning groups has indicated significantly different performances 
in the present sample (using independent sample t-tests). Firstly, on the adult Faux Pas test, 
Zalla et al. (2009) found impaired Faux pas performance in a group of fifteen individuals with 
asperger syndrome (AS) relative to controls. The participants in this study had comparable IQs 
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(AS group: IQ=114, mean age=28, control group: IQ=115, age=27) to the present thesis sample 
(ASD group: IQ=115, age=15; control group: IQ=116, age=14.5). For the Faux pas questions, 
Zalla et al.s’ AS group (M=39.7, SD=9.9) performed significantly less well than the present ASD 
group (Mean=53.69, SD=12.75), t(29)=3.44, p<.01, d=-1.2 with a large effect size. Moreover, 
for Non-faux pas questions, Zalla et al.s’ AS group (M=15.4, SD=5.2) showed a trend toward 
over-detecting faux pas more than the present ASD group (M=18, SD=2.07), t(29)=1.85, 
p=.073, d=0.73. In contrast, Zalla et al.’s control group (Faux pas: M=54, SD=5.8; Non faux pas: 
M=19, SD=1.8) were not significantly different to the present thesis control group (Faux pas: 
M=53.69, SD= 12.75; Non faux pas: M=19.11, SD=3.54). 
 
Secondly, on the Character intentions task, Duverger et al. (2007) tested sixteen adolescents 
with high functioning autism/AS on 13 of the 28 task questions used in the present thesis. 
Means and standard deviations have been converted to percentages to allow a crude 
comparison between studies. Duverger et al.’s AS group (M=75.38%, SD=15.38) performed less 
well than the present thesis ASD group (M=83.93%, SD=19.89), however this difference was 
not significant at the p<.05 level, (30)=1.36, p=0.18. Nonetheless, Duverger et al.s’ AS group 
did score significantly less than the present thesis control group (M=91.68%, SD=7.46), 
t(32)=4.00, p<.001, d=-1.43, with a large effect size. Taken together, these comparisons 
suggest that the non-significant group difference in the present study was due to a superior 
performance in the present thesis ASD group relative to other high functioning ASD samples.  
 
Finally, in the Mind in the Eyes test, a comparison with Baron-Cohen et al.’s (2001) study 
revealed a different pattern. They tested Fifteen HFA AS adults (Mean IQ=115, age=29) and 
fourteen controls (IQ=114, age=28). The AS group (M=21.9, SD=6.6) did not score significantly 
less than the present thesis ASD group (M=21.88, SD=4.86) or the present thesis control group 
(M=23.44, SD=3.05). However, Baron Cohen et al.’s control group (M=30.9, SD=3.0) did score 
significantly more than the present thesis control group, t(30)=6.91, p<.001, d=2.46, with a 
very large effect size. This may reflect the fact that the adult eyes test was a difficult test for 
NT adolescents, who performed less well relative to an NT adult sample. In contrast, the 
present thesis adolescent ASD group performed surprisingly well relative to an adult AS 
sample. It is to be noted that most studies testing children and adolescents have used the 
children’s version of the eyes test. The adult version of the eyes test was chosen for the 
present thesis due to the ASD group having done the children’s version in previous research, 
and because it was expected that the adult test would nonetheless show group differences. 
Moreover, they were provided vocabulary sheets to help understand emotion words on this 
non-timed task. 
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These findings suggest that the present thesis ASD group were superior to comparable high 
functioning ASD samples in published studies on the Faux pas task (Zalla et al, 2009) and the 
Character intentions task (Duverger et al, 2007). Moreover, the present thesis ASD group 
performed similarly to an adult AS group on the adult version of the Mind in the eyes test 
(Baron –Cohen et al, 2001), whereas the present thesis control group were significantly 
inferior compared to an adult control group. If the latter finding suggests that the adult eyes 
test is harder for adolescents, then it also suggests the present thesis ASD group performed 
surprisingly well relative to an adult AS group. This interpretation is in consonance with the 
present thesis ASD group’s superior TOM performance on the Faux pas and Character 
intentions tasks relative to other high functioning ASD groups, and the similar performance of 
the thesis control group to other control groups on these same tasks. Taken together, these 
comparisons lend support to the idea that the present thesis ASD sample did not show 
representative TOM impairments. 
 
3.2.3.2 Could preserved TOM explain the preserved SRE? 
 
The present study and Lombardo et al.’s (2007) study both showed a connection between the 
magnitude of SREs and performance on the eyes test. Moreover, Lombardo et al.’s study not 
only showed that decreased SREs were connected with lower scores on the eyes test, but were 
also connected with the endorsement of autistic traits on the AQ. In Lombardo et al.’s study, 
the ASD group (IQ=114, age=29) and the control group (IQ=117, age=29) were comparable to 
the present thesis sample for IQ. In their study, the ASD group performed significantly less well 
on the adult eyes task compared to controls, and the group difference on the “Self-Harry 
Potter” SRE showed a clear trend toward a reduced SRE in the ASD group (p<.068, d=0.49), 
mirroring the finding of a significantly reduced “Self-Harry Potter” SRE in ASD found by 
Henderson et al. (2009) (reviewed in section 1.4.4.2). 
 
In contrast to Lombardo et al.’s (2007) study, the present thesis did not find significant group 
differences on the eyes test or any difference in the SRE magnitude between groups. In 
comparing eyes test performance between these studies, the same pattern was discovered as 
was found in the comparison with Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) study (see section 3.2.3.1).  That 
is, the present thesis adolescent ASD group (M=21.88, SD=4.86) were not significantly different 
on the adult eyes task compared to Lombardo et al.’s adult ASD group (M=23.73, SD=6.67), 
t(44)=0.98, p=.33, whereas the present thesis Adolescent control group (M=23.44, SD=3.05) 
95 
 
were significantly impaired compared to Lombardo et al.’s adult control group (M=27.03, 
SD=3.9), t(46)=3.34, p<.01, d=1.03, with a large effect size.  
 
In light of the relative difficulty of this adult version of the eyes task for NT adolescents then, 
the present thesis ASD group performed  surprisingly well compared to two adult ASD samples 
(Baron-Cohen et al, 2001; Lombardo et al, 2007). Moreover, since the magnitude of SREs and 
eyes test performance were connected in both Lombardo et al.’s study and the present thesis, 
and the fact that Lombardo et al.’s ASD and control group showed clear group differences on 
both the eyes task and the magnitude of the SRE effect, then it can be reasonably surmised 
that the lack of group differences for the SRE in the present thesis was related to the ASD 
group performing unrepresentatively well on the eyes task. In short, there is evidence that the 
preserved SRE in the present thesis ASD group was related to their demonstrating 
unrepresentatively intact TOM skills. It would therefore be an advantage for future research to 
assess an ASD group who showed more typical TOM deficits.  
 
3.3. Impaired generation of personal attributes 
 
Emerging research in ASD has found impaired psychological self awareness (e.g. awareness of 
one’s own emotions, intentions and ASD traits) in the presence of preserved physical self 
awareness (e.g. sense of agency, action monitoring and attribution, and visuospatial 
perspective taking), discussed in section 1.4.3.1 (e.g. David et al. 2008; David et al, 2010; 
Williams 2010). These selective difficulties in thinking about the psychological self as opposed 
to the physical self have been hypothesised to relate to the socio-communicative impairments 
of ASD and to lead to less elaborate self-concepts (Lind, 2010). Very recently, Jackson et al. 
(2012) explored the possibility of impaired self-understanding using the SUI (Damon and Hart, 
1988, and it was found that the Asperger group produced significantly less social and 
psychological descriptions of themselves compared to NT individuals, whereas the number of 
physical descriptions were not different between groups.  
 
The present thesis aimed to explore whether diminished self understanding in the 
psychological and social domains could be seen on fluency tasks tapping cognitive access to 
self-concepts. Indeed, one clear finding was the reduced generation of personal attributes 
across all tasks with very large effect sizes. Moreover, the NT group made significantly more 
personal attributions in the I Am task compared to social and physical ones, whereas the ASD 
group did not generate more of any particular type. These robust findings demonstrated that 
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high functioning ASD adolescents did not generate as many self and other concepts referring 
to ability-related emotions/thoughts or personality traits that involve some subjective 
judgement (e.g. I am friendly, she is creepy, he is talented). In this sense it showed that a timed 
fluency measure was capable of capturing clear differences in psychological self-awareness at 
the level of cognitive access and generation of self-concepts, mirroring recent findings in the 
SUI (Jackson et al, 2012).  
 
3.3.1 Preserved social understanding 
  
The present studies did not find significant group differences across social attributes (e.g. he is 
a wizard, he is an actor, she is royalty, she is a mother), despite predicting this on the basis of 
Jackson et al.’s (2012) findings with the SUI. However, the present study had collapsed 
together Jackson et al.’s “active” (ability related schema e.g. a biker, a walker) and “social” 
(schema relating to social interactions and relationships e.g. social roles such as “a mother”). 
Moreover it is unclear whether the “social” category in Jackson et al.’s study also included 
more subjective attributions connected with social relationships rather than more objectively 
definable social roles.  
 
The import of this was that the “social” category in the present study by and large related to 
more objectively definable social roles (e.g. I am a father, I am a student, I am a wizard) and 
socially defined abilities (e.g. I am a footballer, I am a hiker) and attributes defined relative to 
society at large (e.g. I am rich, he is famous, she is royalty). It could be argued therefore that 
the “social” category in the present study does not truly reflect the “psychological self-
awareness” side of the divide (Gillihan and Farar, 2005), in that it relates to objective 
information and roles pertaining to the social world.  
 
Moreover, social information relating to Harry Potter and the Queen could be gleaned from 
reading books or watching TV and does not necessarily relate to genuinely acquiring 
psychological knowledge concerning them, or even a subjective sense of what they are like. 
This possibility was perhaps reflected in the results, where significantly more “social” 
statements were made about Harry and the Queen than either the self or unknown others, 
with no group differences. These attributions may largely have reflected semantic social 
knowledge, which would be expected to be more salient for known versus unknown people.  
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Indeed, the SAK versus EAM divide (Lind, 2010, discussed in Sections 1.4.2. and 1.4.4) may 
pertain to part of the distinction between social and personal attributes. Semantic knowledge 
is more factual and does not depend on “autonoetic awareness” in the way that episodic 
memories do (Tulving, 1984). Social attributions for Harry Potter and the Queen reflect 
semantic knowledge, whereas personal attributions may sometimes involve experiencing the 
self, or experiencing others’ through the self (i.e. simulation theory), a possibility explored in 
detail in the next Section 3.3.2. Preserved social but impaired personal attributions in the 
present thesis ASD group may therefore mirror the findings of Crane and Goddard (2007), who 
found preserved SAK but impaired EAM on a fluency task in an adult ASD group (see Section 
1.4.4.1).  
 
3.3.2 What is involved in generating personal attributes? 
 
It is important to consider in more detail what is involved in generating personal attributes for 
other people in contrast to the potentially more objective and factual social attributions. 
Simulation mechanisms are posited as one important means of gaining insight into others 
personalities and phenomenology- that is, into their minds (Epley et al, 2004). All the variants 
on simulation theory share an emphasis on the privileged access one has for one’s own 
phenomenology as an important window into that of others. In this way one can by-pass being 
“behaviourists” and “theorists” in the interpretation of others by “looking inward and 
projecting or simulating that other person as if we are them” (Lombardo et al, 2011). Though 
this is not the only means of understanding others’ minds (Gopnik and Wellman, 1992) it is an 
especially important one in situations where not much “individuating information” is known 
about the target person (Ames 2004a, 2004b, Epley, 2008; reported in Lombardo et al, 2011). 
 
Relating these ideas to the (s)he is tasks, social information is known and shared about Harry 
and the Queen, and social attributions (e.g. he is a wizard, he is an actor, she is royalty, she is a 
mother) were significantly more common for these pictures than for any other pictures. 
However, for the unknown others, little “individuating information” was known about the 
target people, and so the task depended more upon making physical and personal attributions. 
In order to make personal attributions, mechanisms such as simulating and projecting their 
personality, as well as through using stereotypes (see section 3.4) would be needed. Indeed, 
the relative difficulty in doing this was reflected in that more plainly physical attributions were 
made for unknown others compared to all other tasks, presumably because it was harder to 
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generate personal attributions through simulation and stereotypes than it was to focus on 
readily apparent objective physical attributes present in the pictures. 
 
Overall then, the generation of subjective and psychological attributions relating to oneself 
and others, involving emotions, personality traits and character judgements, was significantly 
reduced in the ASD group. Moreover, the ASD group did not show the significant preference 
for personal attributions on the I Am task showed by the NT group. This finding suggests self-
concepts were less elaborate for ASD than for NT adolescents, in line with the hypothesis. 
Furthermore, the nature of the personal attributes closely reflects the underlying deficits in 
psychological self awareness (Williams, 2010) of both self and other in ASD, lending support to 
the hypothesis that diminished self-concepts are a downstream consequence of deficient 
psychological self awareness (e.g. Lind 2010).  
 
3.3.3 Diminished personal attributions and social cognition 
 
Despite the strong theoretical connection between thinking about oneself and thinking about 
others (e.g. Lombardo et al, 2010), only weak relationships were found in respect of group 
differences in generating personal attributes. No individual social cognition measures were 
found to relate to group differences in generating personal attributes. However when the TOM 
tasks were taken together as covariates, group differences did become marginally non-
significant. This somewhat weak connection may partly reflect the relatively spared TOM 
abilities in the ASD group, a limitation discussed in Sections 3.2.2. and 3.2.3  
 
Another limitation of the present study was that the physical, social and personal types of self 
concept were confounded in single task trials. This makes it difficult to separate out the 
impaired generation of personal attributes from the preserved Self Reference Effect (SRE) in 
the present study. Possible explanations for this preserved SRE in the presence of diminished 
overall personal attributions were presented in Section 3.2.  However, investigation of these 
inextricably linked issues requires further research. For example, NT adolescents and those 
with ASD could be asked to generate as many physical attributes for a given picture in one 
minute, followed by one minute for social attributes, followed by a further minute for personal 
attributes. Similar separate trials for the I Am task would then allow the specific and direct 
assessment of SREs for each attribution type across groups.  However, this would come at a 
cost of sacrificing the open-ended nature of the tasks. It is worth noting that the open-ended 
and un-coerced nature of the present tasks is itself informative. ASD adolescents were not as 
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predisposed to generating personal attributes as the NT group. It would be interesting to see 
how they perform in a task that specifically requests them to generate such attributes.    
 
3.4 Social Stereotyping 
 
Social stereotyping emerges in childhood and plays a central role in social interactions, such as 
providing one means of predicting others’ behaviours (Mackie et al, 1996). The “Beauty is 
Good” (BIG) stereotype is one of the most documented, in which children and adults attribute 
“goodness” and other positive traits (e.g. greater intelligence, competence) to attractive rather 
than to unattractive faces (see review in Langlois et al, 2000). Similar stereotypes around 
emotions and happiness (“Happy is Good” HIG) are also seen (Hess, Adams & Kleck, 2008). 
Intuitively it would seem plausible to expect impairments in ASD for social stereotyping due to 
“atypical face processing” (Grelotti, Gauthier, & Schultz, 2002, Rosset et al, 2009), deficits in 
reading emotions in faces, such as in the Mind in the eyes task (Baron-cohen, 2001; Kaland et 
al, 2008), TOM deficits and the emerging picture of psychological self-awareness deficits. 
However, Fonesca et al. (2011) found that ASD children were just as likely to make BIG 
stereotypes as NT children, implying preserved social stereotyping abilities in ASD.  
 
 Contrary to Fonesca et al. (2011) the present study found diminished social stereotyping in 
the ASD group. Significantly fewer ASD adolescents made spontaneous judgements pertaining 
to the goodness or badness of individuals, based upon either their mood or their 
attractiveness. What is more, fewer ASD participants made any judgments at all relating to 
mood and a trend toward fewer judgements relating to attractiveness. Across both groups, 
making judgements of mood and attractiveness correlated significantly with the corresponding 
good/bad judgement, supporting the notion that the underlying BIG, HIG, SIB, and UIB 
stereotypes were the basis of the good/bad judgments.  These findings were more in line with 
what might be expected on the basis of the general socio-communicative impairments seen in 
ASD. 
 
One difference between these studies was that good/bad judgements in the present study 
were made spontaneously whereas Fonesca et al. (2011) asked the children to rate the 
pictures based upon attractiveness, friendliness and intelligence. It is possible that the abilities 
underlying making stereotypes are intact in some way in individuals with ASD but they do not 
utilise those abilities spontaneously in social situations. Indeed, a recent study reported by 
Senju (2012) shows that high functioning ASD adults do not make anticipatory false belief 
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attributions through eye gaze in the Sally Ann false belief task (described in section 1.3.3) 
whereas NT adults do. Moreover, this was despite the ASD group showing normal anticipatory 
eye gaze connected with the puppets’ goals in pre test familiarisation trials and despite easily 
passing the false belief tasks when explicitly asked to do so (Senju, 2012).  
 
Taken together, the present thesis and Senju’s study (2012) provide evidence that ASD 
individuals make less spontaneous judgements pertaining to social situations, even when TOM 
(false belief) and social stereotyping (Fonesca et al, 2011) abilities appear to be intact on 
explicit tests. A lack of spontaneous social judgements and TOM attributions in ASD might be 
expected, considering that compensatory mechanisms are thought to underlie successful TOM 
task completion rather than true social understanding (Happe 1995, see section 1.3.4). Indeed, 
this is consistent with the finding that training on false belief tasks does not improve social 
adaptation in ASD (Ozonoff and Miller 1995). This could potentially explain the persistence of 
everyday socio-communicative impairments in ASD even when aspects of TOM and social 
processing are preserved on certain tasks.  Further research would need to assess spontaneous 
versus explicit social stereotyping in a single study sample to confirm the present findings. 
 
3.5 Clinical implications 
 
The present thesis has found that adolescents with ASD generate significantly fewer personal 
attributes on open ended fluency measures for the self and others, even when controlling for 
general fluency abilities. On the I Am task, adolescents with ASD tended to make statements 
like: I am eleven, I am male, I am blond-haired, I am a daughter, I am a footballer, I am going 
on holiday soon, with a similar frequency to more personal attributions. In contrast, NT 
adolescents made significantly more personal attributions than other attributions on the I Am 
task, and generated significantly more of these personal attributions across all the fluency 
tasks, such as: I am quick tempered, I am passionate, I am artistic, I am sporty, I am 
enthusiastic, I am helpful, I am friendly, I am lonely, I am stressed.  The decreased focus on 
personal attributions for ASD adolescents implies that they have less elaborate self concepts 
than NT individuals, as suggested by other researchers (Lind, 2010; Goddard & Crane, 2008; 
Jackson et al, 2012). Several clinical implications follow from these findings.  
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3.5.1 Diminished Psychological Awareness  
 
The findings add to and strengthen the emerging picture of preserved physical self awareness 
in the presence of reduced psychological self awareness in ASD (e.g. Williams, 2010). Taken 
together, these findings suggest that the concepts ASD individuals have about themselves and 
others are likely to lack key psychological dimensions that will inevitably impact on their social 
interactions. For example, in the context of “disease awareness”, chronic disorders are known 
to play a crucial role in self identity and its formation for adolescents (Roncevic et al, 2006). 
However, no one in the high functioning ASD group said “I am autistic”; a personal attribution 
that would have demonstrated such disease awareness. As one parallel example, research 
using the I Am tasks with individuals with temporal lobe epilepsy commonly found “I am 
epileptic” as self identity statements (Illman et al, 2011). The emerging finding of diminished 
self concepts in ASD highlights the need to anticipate unique difficulties relating to self 
referential cognition, self understanding, and disease awareness, even in the context of the 
above average cognitive skills and developed compensatory mechanisms for handling some 
social situations.  
 
3.5.2 Utility of Fluency measures for tapping self-concepts  
 
The findings demonstrate that fluency measures aimed at tapping self and other concepts are 
sensitive to the differences between NT individuals and those with ASD.  Moreover, the 
differences in generating self and other concepts seen for adolescents with ASD appears to 
closely map the emerging psychological/physical self awareness divide. This has potential 
clinical value in that fluency measures are quick to administer and provide a quantifiable 
means of assessing the self-construct through the open ended generation of self-concepts. The 
robust group differences found here with large effect sizes holds promise for this approach in 
assessing the relative strengths and weaknesses of ASD individuals in terms of self awareness 
and diminished self-concepts.  
 
More research would be needed to assess the connections between the generation of self and 
other concepts and the emerging picture of underlying psychological self awareness deficits. If 
such connections can be established the clinical value of such fluency measures could 
conceivably extend to aiding with diagnosis. Diagnosis of an ASD, particularly at the high 
functioning end where difficulties may not be recognised until adolescence or later, can take 
several interviews and multidisciplinary collaboration before a diagnostic decision is reached.  
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As research into SRC continues to shed light on this emerging dimension of ASDs, refined 
understanding will in time be incorporated into the ever evolving diagnostic process.  Whilst 
such tools as fluency tasks can never be a substitute for clinical interviews, clinicians are often 
on the look-out for quick to administer tools with established specificity and sensitivity that 
can assist them in focussing, highlighting and supplementing their clinical decisions.  Of course, 
the development and refinement of such fluency based tools would require a great deal of 
further research, but these present findings hold promise for the value of fluency tasks in 
tapping key differences at the self-concept level, showing robust and large group differences 
between NT adolescents and those with ASD. 
 
3.5.3 Spontaneous application of social processing- a unique deficit? 
 
Finally, the findings relating to a lack of spontaneous social stereotypes in the ASD group may 
suggest difficulties in actively applying mechanisms known to aid social interactions (Mackie et 
al. 1996). If further research can confirm that individuals with an ASD can have preserved TOM 
(Senju, 2012) and preserved social stereotyping abilities (Fonesca et al, 2011) whilst not 
spontaneously applying these abilities in respect of social information and situations, then this 
represents an important development in the way in which the socio-communicative 
impairments are conceptualised. It adds another dimension to the emerging picture in ASD of 
the “absent self”, possibly involving a lack of top-down control in governing and guiding 
behaviour (Frith 2003; Baron-Cohen, 2005; Hobson et al. 2006).  
 
From the clinical perspective, such a shift would suggest a focus on developing and researching 
compensatory strategies for ASD individuals aimed at bringing on line these preserved 
mechanisms in social situations where they might be useful. The lack of information on how 
ASD individuals experience their world and on what therapeutic approaches may be of help to 
them has been noted in a recent review (Koenig & Levine, 2012). The emerging emphasis on 
an “absence” of a particular kind of self awareness related to top-down processing and 
psychological self-understanding could pave the way for a better understanding of the 
disorder and its treatment.  
 
In particular, whilst several recent therapeutic interventions show improvement on measures 
of TOM, emotional recognition and executive functions  in children and adolescents with ASD 
taking part in training programmes (Taghva et al. 2011; Stichter et al. 2012), this in itself may 
not be enough if these improved abilities are not spontaneously applied to real world social 
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settings.  Indeed, one study found that training on false belief tasks did not improve social 
adaptation (Ozonoff & Miller 1995). Finding ways to compensate for a lack of the spontaneous 
application of otherwise preserved social processing abilities would represent a distinctly new 
focus for clinical interventions in ASD. 
 
3.6 Future Research 
 
This section briefly recapitulates the main areas of further research highlighted throughout the 
discussion.  The addition of a “known friend” condition would allow further exploration of the 
SRE for self and other concepts, and furthermore would not require a ‘picture cue’ like the 
existing (s)he is tasks (see Section 3.2). At the cost of sacrificing the open-ended nature of the 
tasks, separate trials on the I Am and (s)he is tasks could explore physical, social and personal 
attributions individually, so as to better delineate SREs by type, and to assess deficits for those 
with ASD in generating personal attributions when exclusively asked to do so (see Section 
3.3.3.). It would be fruitful to explore these effects and their relationships to measures of 
social cognition in an ASD sample with more representative TOM deficits (see Section 3.2.3).  
 
In respect of social stereotypes, the present thesis has generated a hypothesis suggesting that 
individuals with an ASD may not spontaneously apply otherwise preserved social processing 
skills such as stereotyping (Fonesca et al, 2011; Senju, 2012).  Future research would need to 
test this hypothesis through exploring implicit and spontaneous social stereotyping versus 
explicit stereotyping in a single study sample (see Section 3.4). This would have important 
implications for how clinicians design and test interventions aimed at helping individuals with 
an ASD manage their socio-communicative difficulties (see Section 3.5.3). Finally, the present 
thesis has demonstrated the value of fluency measures in capturing important differences in 
ASD groups at the level of cognitive access and generation of self concepts. Future research 
might profitably explore the use of such measures for both theoretical and clinical purposes 
(e.g. see Section 3.5.2). 
 
3.7 Conclusions 
 
This thesis has utilised novel fluency tasks to explore self referential cognition (SRC) in NT 
adolescents and those with ASD. Clear SREs have been demonstrated on these fluency tasks at 
the level of cognitive access and generation of self-concepts, and it has been found that these 
effects are connected with personal but not social or physical attributions for both groups. The 
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magnitude of SREs was found to relate to the eyes task, paralleling previous research 
(Lombardo et al, 2007), and provides further support for the proposed close link between SRC 
and social cognition (Lombardo et al. 2007; 2010; Baron-Cohen et al, 2010).  
 
The ASD group demonstrated a large and significant reduction in the generation of personal 
attributes across all fluency tasks, even when controlling for category fluency.  On the I Am 
task, the control group showed a significant preference for personal attributions whereas the 
ASD group did not. These findings support the emerging picture of a specific deficit in 
psychological but not physical self awareness (Williams, 2010), and suggest that the 
downstream impoverishment of psychological self-concepts very recently reported with the 
SUI (Jackson et al, 2012) can also be tapped with quick to administer fluency measures.  
Together, these findings provide further support for the “absent self hypothesis” of ASD (e.g. 
Frith, 2003)- an idea that, rather than implying a total absence of self, suggests deficits in a 
particular kind of top-down self awareness.  
 
The ASD group also showed a significant lack of spontaneous social stereotyping on the 
unknown fluency tasks relative to the NT group.  In the context of preserved social 
stereotyping and TOM abilities (Fonesca et al. 2011; Senju et al, 2012), this lack of 
spontaneous application may highlight an important development in understanding the socio-
communicative impairments of ASD and a needed focus for the development of clinical 
interventions that are likely to help individuals with the disorder (Koenig & Levine, 2012).   
 
Finally, the novel fluency measures used in this thesis have shown promising utility in 
measuring aspects of ‘the self’, capturing theoretically significant differences between NT and 
ASD groups.  It is intended that similar fluency tasks will be taken up in future research 
connected with SRC and social cognition in ASD.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Introductory ideas to explain to pupils 
Most of the tasks you’ll be doing look at how you think about yourselves and other 
people- that is, what’s important to you about who you are, and what you imagine and 
notice about others based on how they look to you.  
 
All of the tasks involved are timed- usually just one minute to complete each task. But 
don’t worry! It is not a test! You do not have to give your name on the sheets, only 
your age and whether you are a male or a female is needed so please don’t be self-
conscious or worried about what responses you give or whether you manage many 
responses or only a few responses in the time allowed. Just be honest and try your 
best on each task.  
 
Also don’t worry about asking the teacher too many questions about whether it is 
alright to put one type of answer down or not. For most tasks the teacher will provide 
some example answers. Other than that so long as YOU think your answer goes with 
the question then it is OK to put it down. There is no right or wrong answer. 
 
You are helping me to design tasks to look at how children with autism think about 
themselves and other people, and whether this is affected by their condition.  
 
So please accept my big THANKYOU for completing the tasks. Your answers will be 
used in real research!! 
 
Instructions for ANIMAL task 
 
Please ask pupils to put their age and gender at the top of the page.  
 
Also, although pupils do not have to give their real name, it would be helpful if they 
marked the sheets they use in some way (e.g. with a fake name or initials).  What is 
important is that they use the same name or marking on every sheet so that I can 
know the responses to different tasks were given by the same person. If they are 
happy to use their real names that is fine, but they do not have to. 
 
The ANIMAL task is timed- pupils need to write down as many animals/living creatures 
as they can in ONE minute. Pupils should NOT add new animals after the minute is 
over, and should work on their own.  
 
 
Instructions for “I Am Statements task” 
 
Please describe this task to the pupils as per the instructions on the task page.  
 
After the minute is up please ask pupils not to add any further “I Am statements”. 
After completing the task please ask pupils to mark what they consider are the three 
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most important “I Am statements” they have made by putting the numbers, 1,2 and 3 
next to these statements. 
 
“In this next task, you are again being asked to write down as many different things 
you can think of.  But in this case, we are looking at aspects of YOURSELF.  These 
should be aspects about yourself that you consider describe important features of your 
identity- of who you are.  Write these in by completing the phrase, I am … .  For 
example, someone might write: I am a teacher, I am a big sister, I am red-haired, I am 
quick-tempered.” 
Please do not start the task below until instructed to do so. 
In the space below, write as many different I AM STATEMENTS as you can (you will 
be given one minute). 
 
Instructions for “He is/she is task” 
 
This task is presented on a powerpoint slide show. There are 6 pictures of different 
people in all. The first slide explains some brief instructions, but please make sure the 
pupils understand all the following points before they begin the actual task: 
 
 This “He is/She is” task is similar to the “I Am task” you have just done. When 
you see the pictures, please write as many “(S)he is...”statements for each 
picture as you can in One minute.  
 
 Once the picture is on screen you have One minute to write as many 
statements as you can. There are no right or wrong answers; you are 
encouraged to describe what you notice about the people and what you think 
they are like. Each picture will be presented for One minute each.  
 
 It is highly likely you will recognise the first two pictures as very famous people 
(but don’t worry if you don’t!). You can make statements about these people 
based on the pictures OR on what you know or think of the person. Please 
make statements about these people in whatever way seems best to you. 
There are no right or wrong answers.  
 
 You will NOT recognise the last 4 pictures on the task. Please make statements 
about these people based on what you think about them from the picture. For 
example, you might make statements about their physical appearance such as 
their age or looks, or what you think about their mood and “personality”. You 
are free to describe them in whatever way you think is best.  
 
 Note to teacher: please don’t give too many examples of how pupils might 
describe the pictures. It is more important that pupils are not biased too much. 
It does not matter if pupils are only able to give a few statements for each 
picture. It is more important that they are not biased, and that they generate 
their own ideas. Many thanks. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 
Rate the ‘selves’ and characteristics along three dimensions 
 
1) Physical 
 
A physical attribute will be one which is readily apparent from the picture itself, or 
from the person themselves.  Such as age, size of facial features, gender, hair 
colour, distinguishing features, size, clothes. 
 
The next two categories are character-based and are not outwardly judged by the 
physical appearance. These would include hobbies and socio-demographic factors, 
social roles, personality traits, moods, preferences, likes and dislikes. 
 
2) Social Roles and Functions 
 
These describe social roles, traits and features which are readily apparent and 
objectively verifiable – such as, mother, footballer, Leeds fan, famous 
 
3) Personal 
 
These describe personality traits, features and abilities which involve some 
subjective opinion such as, angry, hungry, scary, mean, a bully etc. 
 
Please ignore names in the count – e.g. The Queen, Daniel Radcliffe, and all names 
in the I am task too. 
 
 
Please see the Table below for several examples of coding....  
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Table to show examples of coding: 
 
Physical Social Personal 
Boy  Scout Smart 
Young  Hockey Player Caring 
Old Hiker Kind 
Black-Haired Biker Friendly 
Brown-eyed Famous Voldermort-hater 
Bearded Actor Posh 
Ugly Rich Upset 
Staring eyes Lives in a mansion Serious 
Ear piercing In a film Weird 
Scruffy beard Royalty Dumb 
Blonde Mother Happy 
Wearing a uniform A wizard Sorted 
Wrinkly Student Giving 
Smiling Grand-daughter Moody 
Has a weird haircut English Angry 
Casting a spell Hero Creepy 
Wearing a tie A footballer Sporty 
Having a bad hair day A punk Concentrating 
Middle-aged Going on holiday 
soon 
Stressed 
  Daydreaming 
  Depressed 
  Helpful 
  Glamorous 
  Talented 
  Lucky 
  Mature 
   
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
123 
 
APPENDIX 3 
 
A Table to show correlations between category fluency (animals) and the I Am and (s)he is 
tasks in Study 1 
 
 
 
A table to show spearman’s rho correlations between Happiness/attractiveness judgements 
and judgments of goodness/badness. 
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APPENDIX 4 
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APPENDIX 5 
 
 
Character Intentions task an example: 
 
 
 
 
Mind in the Eyes task, an example 
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Faux Pas question, an example: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
127 
 
Yoni Task, a still image of several example trials: 
 
 
 
 
 
  
